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The problem of xenophobia has gained remarkable notoriety of late,
and reports from around the world paint a chilling picture of its viru-
lence, especially where refugees and other involuntary migrants are con-
cerned. How should one understand this global picture of xenophobic
contestation and its fallout, and specifically, how should one under-
stand international law's relationship to both?
The first contribution of this Article is to introduce an emerging
global framework intended by states and other international actors to
improve global cooperation to combat the problem of xenophobia. This
global anti-xenophobia framework (the Framework) is rooted in inter-
national human rights law and in the global involuntary migration
governance regime, which includes international refugee law and will
soon include the Global Compacts on Migration and on Refugees. This
Article traces the historical development of the Framework, outlines its
architecture, and assesses the key debates among states regarding the
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status of global norms on xenophobia. Doing so illuminates the evolving
normative, doctrinal, and institutional commitments of the Framework.
The second contribution of this Article is to identify an untenable
blind spot in the emerging Framework, which ignores various ways that
features of the global governance of involuntary migration make the
problem of xenophobia worse. This Article argues that the global invol-
untary migration governance regime has built-in gaps and incentive
structures that increase opposition-including xenophobic opposition-
to the admission and inclusion of involuntary migrants. The Article
thus lays out how specific features of international aw and policy on
involuntary migration are themselves eemingly part of the problem of
xenophobia.
The final contribution of this Article is to offer concrete recommen-
dations for how the Framework could be supplemented to include atten-
tion to the counterproductive ffects that governance structures and
state activity within them contribute to the problem of xenophobia.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Existing global frameworks governing the movement of people
across international borders are ill-suited to such movement.' This Ar-
ticle specifically focuses on the manner in which these frameworks can
heighten problems they should not, make dangerous journeys worse,
and exacerbate conflict regarding where people go and their fate on
arrival. This Article examines this counterintuitive dynamic in the con-
text of large-scale contemporary involuntary migration2 and the grow-
ing problem of xenophobia that accompanies it.
1. In 2017, the American Journal of International Law Unbound published a
three-part symposium with essays by migration experts all beginning from the premise
that "international migration law needs to be radically redesigned." See generally Jaya
Ramji-Nogales & Peter J. Spiro, Introduction to Symposium on Framing Global Migra-
tion Law, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 134 (2017). These essays provide a good intro-
duction to some of the most pressing shortcomings of existing frameworks. Id.
2. The United Nations Migration Agency (IOM) defines a migrant as "any person
who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from
his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal status; (2) whether
the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or
(4) what the length of the stay is." Who is a Migrant?, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
FOR MIGRATION (2018), https://www.iom.int/who-is-a-migrant (last visited Jan. 19, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/639V-PLZJ] (archived Jan. 19, 2018). I use the term involuntary mi-
gration to refer to the coerced movement of persons, and while this coerced movement
may remain internal to one's country of nationality, my focus is coerced movement that
drives persons across international borders. The movement of involuntary migrants may
be coerced by persecution, conflict, natural or climate change-related disasters and ex-
treme economic hardship. As a result, involuntary migrants may be refugees but the
category extends to include coerced movement that is not legally protected by interna-
tional law. Under international law a refugee is a person who is outside her country of
nationality owing to a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, nationality,
political opinion, religion, or membership in a particular social group, and who due to
that fear will not avail herself of that country's protection. G.A. Res. 429 (V), art. 1, §
A(2), Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (June 28, 1951). Throughout this
Article I use the term "refugee" in its international legal sense.
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Between mid-2015 and mid-2016, over 1 million involuntary mi-
grants including Syrian refugees sought refuge in Europe.3 Many Eu-
ropean states responded with vitriolic anti-migrant policies.4 For ex-
ample, at Hungary's border, Syrian refugees and other involuntary
migrants faced brutal beatings, razor-sharp fences, and other tactics to
prevent their entry.5 A member of Hungary's government publicly re-
marked that hanging pigs' heads at that country's border might effec-
tively deter arrival of Muslim refugees.6 In this period Hungary's Pres-
ident described migration as "poison," adding that "every single
migrant poses a public security and terror risk."7 Following the United
Kingdom's referendum to exit the European Union, xenophobic speech
and violence saw a sharp rise in that country.8 And despite the geo-
graphic remoteness of the United States from the events in Europe,
3. See Operational Portal: Refugee Situations, UN REFUGEE AGENCY,
http://data.unher.org/mediterranean/regional.php (last visited Jan. 19, 2018)
[https://perma.cclN7BS-XD3G] (archived Jan. 19, 2018).
4. See Big, Bad Visegrad, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.econo-
mist.com/newsleurope/2 1689629-migration-crisis-has-given-unsettling-new-direction-
old-alliance-big-bad-visegrad [https://perma.cc/2ZHC-8MRR] (archived Jan. 19, 2018)
(describing the xenophobic response of the Visegrad, and the rise of xenophobic political
parties across Europe). Some did not. The leading example of a state that took measure
to admit and include Syrian refugees as many others took an opposing stance, is Ger-
many. See Allan Hall & John Lichfield, Germany Opens Its Gates: Berlins Says All Syr-
ian Asylum-Seekers are Welcome to Remain, as Britain is Urged to Make a 'Similar State-
ment,' INDEPENDENT (Aug. 24, 2015, 7:25 BST), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/worldleurope/germany-opens-its-gates-berlin-says-all-syrian-asylum-seekers-are-
welcome-to-remain-as-britain-is-10470062.html [https://perma.cc/SFZ8-2DFK] (ar-
chived Jan. 19, 2018) (describing the new open door policy in Berlin, Germany).
5. See Associated Press, Refugees Being Severely Abused by Hungarian Authori-
ties, Report Alleges, CBCNEWS (Jul. 13, 2016, 12:49 AM), http://www.cbc.cal
news/world/hungary-serbia-border-refugees-beatings-violence-human-rights-watch-
1.3676608 [https://perma.cc/7N67-XV5J] (archived Jan. 19, 2018)_("Hungarian police
and soldiers have beaten some refugees severely before sending them back across the
border to Serbia.").
6. Nick Squires, Hungarian Politician Suggests Hanging Pigs' Heads Along Bor-
der to Deter Muslim Refugees, THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 22, 2016, 12:27 PM), http://www.tel-
egraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/22/hungarian-politician-suggests-hanging-pigs-heads-along-
border-to/ [https://perma.cc/8KK7-3RT3] (archived Jan. 19, 2018).
7. Hungarian Prime Minister Says Migrants Are 'Poison' and 'Not Needed,' THE
GUARDIAN (Jul. 26, 2016, 8:13 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jull
26/hungarian-prime-minister-viktor-orban-praises-donald-trump [https://perma.ccl3253
-A2QM] (archived Jan. 19, 2018).
8. See Brexit Vote Has Led to Noticeable Rise in UK Xenophobia, Watchdog
Warns, INDEPENDENT (OCT. 4, 2016, 12:22 AM), http://www.independ-
ent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-vote-has-led-to-noticeable-rise-in-uk-xenophobia-
watchdog-warns-a7343646.html [https://perma.cc/9H4X-JJDK] (archived Jan. 18, 2018)




xenophobic backlash nonetheless escalated here, too. In his presiden-
tial campaign, Donald Trump espoused an explicit anti-Muslim, Islam-
ophobic rhetoric, which characterized Islam and its adherents as per
se threats to the United States. Among his campaign promises was a
"total and complete shutdown" of Muslims entering the United States.9
And during this campaign and following his election, reports docu-
mented a spike in prejudice-motivated crimes against Muslims in the
United States,1 0 while governors, mayors, and members of Congress
9. Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for 'Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims
Entering the United States,' WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-com-
plete-shutdown-of-muslims-entering-the-united-states/?utm-term=.c2967a8 1a5fI
[https://perma.ce/5XSY-TV79] (archived Jan. 19, 2018).
10. See Rob Crilly, Anti-Muslim Hate Groups on the Rise in the US, THE
NATIONAL (March 2, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.thenational.ae/worldlamericas/anti-
muslim-hate-groups-on-the-rise-in-the-us [https://perma.cc/5JYW-SF2V] (archived Jan.
19, 2018_("more than 100 organisations are showing open hostility to Muslims ... the
most important factor has been the Trump campaign"); Carol Kuruvilla, Anti-Muslim
Hate Crimes Are Spiking in the U.S. Donald Trump Won't Speak Up, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 25, 2017, 12:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.comlentry/trump-islamophobia-
anti-semitismus_58b08debe4b0780bac2938b4 [https://perma.cc/9D8W-H658] (archived
Jan. 19, 2018) ("Since Trump entered the White House, mosques have been vandalized
and even set on fire, a prominent Muslim civil rights leader has been threatened with
physical assault, and Muslim university students have been targeted with racist fliers
and propaganda."); Alexis Okeowo, Hate on the Rise After Trump's Election, NEWYORKER
(Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.newyorker.comilnews/news-desk/hate-on-the-rise-after-
trumps-election [https://perma.cc/T62W-ZH56] (archived Jan. 19, 2018) (saying there
has been a "spike in harassment, a spike in vandalism, physical assaults" in the seven
days since Trump's election). The escalation of Islamophobia under the Trump Presi-
dency is part of a larger resurgence of white supremacist ideology-Lauren Meltzer &
Tony Dokoupil, Hate Rising: White Supremacy's Rise in the U.S., CBS NEWS (Aug. 21,
2017, 5:57 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hate-rising-cbsn-on-assignment/
[https://perma.cc/GSJ9-25SR] (archived Jan. 19, 2018)-that has enjoyed the support of
President Trump. See, e.g., Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, Trump Is Criticized for
Not Calling Out White Supremacists, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/08/12/us/trump-charlottesville-protest-nationalist-riot.html?mcubz=3
(subscription required) [https://perma.cc/7G7M-CCKU] (archived Jan. 19, 2018).
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called for blanket exclusion of refugees from Syria, alleging urgent na-
tional security concerns.1 This is but a snapshot of a problem of global
prevalence.12
At present, there is no consensus definition of xenophobia or xen-
ophobic discrimination in international law. For the purposes of this
Article, "xenophobia" refers to a certain class of illegitimate anti-for-
eigner attitudes and actions that should be understood as political in
fundamental respects.13 A later Part details the prevailing ambiguity
11. In his first week in office, President Trump went on to sign an Executive
Order that banned entry to the United States: (1) indefinitely for all nationals of seven
Muslim-majority countries; (2) indefinitely for Syrian refugees approved for resettle-
ment; and (3) for a period of ninety days for all other refugees approved for resettlement.
See generally Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977-8982 (Feb. 1, 2017),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-02-01/pdf/2017-02281.pdf (last visited Jan. 19,
2018) [https://perma.cc/J8UJ-TLQ4] (archived Jan. 19, 2018) [hereinafter "Executive Or-
der"]. The Trump administration later amended this Executive Order numerous times
over the course of litigation challenging its legality.
12. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary
Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/32/50, ¶¶ 36-67 (2016) (describing manifestations of xenophobia in Africa, the
Americas, the Asia-Pacific Region, the Middle East and North Africa, and Europe). At
the end of 2016, Dictionary.com celebrated the word "xenophobia" as its word of the year
due to worldwide user interest in the word, signaled by the pervasiveness of the term in
the service's lookup data. Dictionary.com's 2016 Word of the Year: Xenophobia,
DICTIONARY.COM (Nov. 28, 2016), http://blog.dictionary.com/xenophobial
[https://perma.cc/KB7C-JMKU] (archived Jan. 19, 2018). This Article focuses on global
resistance to involuntary migrants in the sense that such migrant resistance is widely
distributed across the globe. Id. As a matter of record, this resistance has occurred along-
side competing popular protest in support of involuntary migrant inclusion. One example
is the Refugees Welcome movement mobilizing private citizens across Europe to provide
accommodation and other support to involuntary migrants. REFUGEES WELCOME,
http://www.refugees-welcome.net/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2018) [https://perma.cc/JEE5-
CNPP) (archived Jan. 19, 2018).
13. A dictionary definition of xenophobia highlights its psychological dimen-
sion-irrational fear or dislike of foreigners. Xenophobia, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/xenophobia (last visited Jan. 19, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/C9ES-HQK3] (archived Jan. 19, 2019). The psychological dimensions
of xenophobia ought not to eclipse its political dimensions. Political here means funda-
mentally implicating the constitution, boundaries, and beneficiaries of the nation-state.
Xenophobia involves policing of the demarcation between "deserving" natives and "un-
deserving" foreigners, and contestation of the validity of foreigners' physical presence in
a given territory or the legitimacy of their enjoyment of the perceived benefits of citizen-
ship. This political conception of xenophobia resonates with that advanced by David
Haekwon Kim and Ronald R. Sundstrom who have usefully theorized xenophobia as
"civic ostracism." David Haekwon Kim & Ronald R. Sundstrom, Xenophobia nd Racism,
2(1) CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RACE 21, 24 (2014). On this view, xenophobia concerns the
"ethical relations of the polity," id. at 23, and characterizing xenophobia as civic ostra-
cism centers "on the notion that inclusion in the civic mainstream is a precondition for
certain social goods (including officially recognized and sanctioned social relations) and
is itself a good, and thus its denial through ostracism, whether intentional or neglectful,
[VOL.51:333338
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at the international level as to precisely how this class of illegitimate
attitudes and action is delineated. But at this early stage it is sufficient
to describe xenophobic attitudes and actions as those that have the
purpose or effect of racialized exclusion of non-nationals.14 Although
shifts in global involuntary displacement have reinvigorated scholarly
attempts to conceptualize different facets of global migration govern-
ance,15 little exists on the specific question of xenophobia.'6 This Article
addresses this gap.
The first contribution of this Article is to describe an emerging
global framework intended by its authors to improve international co-
operation to combat the problem of xenophobia (the Framework).1 7 Re-
cent developments in this emerging Framework include a UN Human
Rights Council Resolution initiating the drafting of new international
law criminalizing acts of a xenophobic nature. In parallel, states and
other international actors are engaged in a separate process intended
to revamp the global governance of involuntary migration through two
new global agreements: a Global Compact for Refugees, and a Global
Compact on Migration. In this context, the United Nations Secretary-
General has initiated "a global campaign.led by the United Nations to
counter xenophobia"'8 as a fundamental feature of an international re-
gime capable of addressing large movements of migrants and refugees.
In the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (New York
Declaration) adopted in September 2016, UN member states con-
demned xenophobia and committed to implementation of the global
is morally condemnable." Id. at 24. Typical conceptions of xenophobia and xenophobic
discrimination spotlight explicit anti-foreigner prejudice as a defining characteristic, but
I have argued elsewhere for the need for a structural conception of xenophobic discrimi-
nation, attentive to xenophobic harm that can occur absent explicit anti-foreigner preju-
dice. E. Tendayi Achiume, Beyond Prejudice: Structural Xenophobic Discrimination
Against Refugees, 45 GEO. J. INT'L L. 323 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstractid=2294557 [https://perma.cc/P9Z9-DN7B] (archived Jan. 19, 2018)
(conceptualizing structural xenophobic discrimination and arguing that certain forms of
it are prohibited by international human rights law).
14. See infra Part I(a) and II(a).
15. See generally AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHARTING NEW
FRONTIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (110th ASIE Annual Meeting ed. 2016) (convening
session of migration experts to discuss the cannon of international migration law);
VINCENT CHETAIL, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2014) (provid-
ing a comprehensive historical and doctrinal study of international migration law).
16. One exception is Achiume, supra note 13.
17. I refer to this interchangeably as "the global anti-xenophobia framework" or
"the Framework."
18. U.N. Secretary-General, In Safety and Dignity: Addressing Large Movements
of Refugees and Migrants, T 61, U.N. Doc. A/70/59 (Apr. 21, 2016).
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anti-xenophobia campaign.'9 This Article situates these developments
in a broader trajectory of global cooperation to combat xenophobia and
its manifestations to sketch, for the first time, the apparatus of the
nascent Framework. This Article also identifies and assesses the key
debates among states, occurring within the Framework regarding xen-
ophobia under international law. Understanding the emerging norma-
tive, doctrinal, and institutional commitments of this Framework is vi-
tal, not least because this Framework may well be a prototype or
precursor to a full-fledged global anti-xenophobia regime.
The second contribution of this Article is to bring to light a dan-
gerous blind spot in the emerging Framework that ignores various
ways that features of the global governance of involuntary migration
2 0
itself make the problem of xenophobia worse.
21 Study of the Frame-
work reveals priority of what I have identified elsewhere as the preju-
dice approach to combatting the problem of xenophobia.
2 2 Through this
19. See G.A. Res. 71/1, ¶ 14, New York Declaration (Sept. 19, 2016),
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/events/conferences/57e39d987/new-york-declaration-refu-
gees-migrants.html [https://perma.cclPY2A-PLW5] (archived Jan. 19, 2019) [hereinafter
New York Declaration] ("[w]e strongly condemn acts and manifestations of racism, racial
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance against refugees and migrants").
20. Global governance can be defined as "any purposeful activity intended to
'control' or influence someone else that either occurs in the arena occupied by nations or,
occurring at other levels, projects influence into that arena." Lawrence S. Finkelstein,
What is Global Governance?, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 367, 368 (1995). I focus more nar-
rowly here on the international (and regional) legal and policy regimes that regulate
involuntary migration, as well as the national (and regional) practices of states in the
arena of involuntary migration. For an insightful account of the contradictions and harm
of a "good governance" approach to migration, which treats this phenonmenan as a man-
agerial problem, see ITAMAR MANN, HUMANITY AT SEA (2016) 189-194.
21. The problem of xenophobia is broader in scope than I address in this Article.
I focus on xenophobia targeting or responsive to international migration but xenophobia
also plays itself on the basis of migration that is internal to a given nation-state, such as
when those targeted as foreign are constructed as such on the basis of their ethnicity or
regional origin as opposed to their formal nationality. See, e.g., Aurelia Wa Kabwe-
Segatti and Loren B. Landau, Displacement and Difference in Lubumbashi, 27 FORCED
MIGRATION REVIEW 71-72 (2007) (describing xenophobic backlash against internally dis-
placed nationals rather than against non-nationals). The international frameworks I fo-
cus on in this Article may be less central to making sense of such cases. At the same
time, even when xenophobia directly concerns international migration, it has implica-
tions for the treatment of minorities in receiving countries even when these minorities
are citizens and thus formally "insiders." Xenophobic discrimination against African or
Arab refugees can amplify xenophobic discrimination against African- and Arab-Ameri-
cans, for example. For examples of such instances, see infra Part II. This is especially
important where domestic and international discourses about exclusion are mutually
constitutive, and are responsive to the same incidents of mass displacement as is the
case today. In the latter cases, understanding domestic xenophobia dynamics requires
attention to international frameworks.
22. I first conceptualized the prejudice approach in Beyond Prejudice in relation
to the work of one international agency-the UN Refugee Agency. Achiume, supra note
[VOL.51:333340
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prejudice approach, global actors prioritize initiatives improving inter-
personal relations among private citizens and involuntary migrants
and guaranteeing punishment of anti-foreigner conduct explicitly mo-
tivated by prejudice. This effectively reduces the problem of xenopho-
bia primarily to a problem of individuals harboring xenophobic preju-
dice, requiring international engagement or cooperation that combats
xenophobic prejudice and its manifestations at the level of individuals.
There is merit to anti-xenophobia intervention at this level, but a
broader approach is necessary.
Global governance of involuntary migration occurs largely
through international human rights law and international refugee law,
which establish various rules and principles constraining states' treat-
ment of involuntary migrants.23 Both bodies of law provide vital pro-
tections to involuntary migrants. However, this Article argues that the
governance regime they undergird has built-in gaps and incentive
structures that increase opposition-including xenophobic opposi-
tion-to the admission and inclusion of involuntary migrants.24 In the
New York Declaration, UN member states pledge to "consider review-
ing [their] migration policies with a view to examining their possible
unintended negative consequences."25 This Article makes a significant
contribution in this regard. It provides an account of how specific fea-
tures of international law and policy on involuntary migration are
seemingly themselves part of the problem of xenophobia. These flawed
features reside mainly in the international law relating to refugee cost-
and responsibility-sharing, and that relating to the passage and admis-
sion of involuntary migrants, as well as common state practice on these
issues. Addressing these features is as least as urgent as combatting
individual prejudice.
13, at 355-61. In the present Article I argue the prejudice approach prevails across the
Framework, and characterizes the global approach as opposed to that of one institution
within the Framework. More significantly, Beyond Prejudice focused on how a prejudice
approach elides what I identified as the structural operation of xenophobic discrimina-
tion against refugees. Id. at 359-60. My aim here is different-I offer an account of how
a prejudice approach neglects structural drivers of xenophobia and xenophobic exclusion,
even though global involuntary migration frameworks and the international law at their
core seemingly facilitate these drivers.
23. Other areas of international law, including the law of the sea, are applicable
to involuntary migration but international refugee law and international human rights
are the most salient for my analysis. See JANE MCADAM, COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION
IN INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 6-10 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (explaining the bases
of internationally protected involuntary migration).
24. See infra Part II.
25. See New York Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 45, but this is nowhere near
enough.
2018J] 341
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The third contribution of this Article is to offer concrete proposals
for how the prejudice approach could be supplemented to include seri-
ous attention to the dangerous effects that governance structures and
state activity within them contribute to the problem of xenophobia.
Many of the principal challenges of involuntary migration today-xen-
ophobia included-speak to the very foundations of the nation-state
system, deeply implicating popular and legal conceptions of state sov-
ereignty. Fully confronting these challenges requires a radical rethink-
ing of the relationship between territory and political community in
our world of increasing international mobility. It is, however, beyond
the scope of this Article to advance a proposal for reform at that level.
2 6
The aim here is instead to advocate for a more attainable shift in the
emerging Framework, one that does not eliminate the root of the prob-
lems the Article identifies but that nonetheless diminishes the inhu-
manity and suffering that attends the status quo.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II identifies
the nascent global anti-xenophobia framework in international human
rights law and recent global initiatives governing involuntary displace-
ment and explains its prejudice approach. Part III posits features in
the structure and content of the global governance of involuntary mi-
gration that seem to ratchet up the problem of xenophobia, using ex-
amples from recent events of mass involuntary displacement. Part IV
identifies important policy reform implications of the arguments, prior
to the Article's conclusion.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A SOLUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
EMERGING ANTI-XENOPHOBIA FRAMEWORK
At present, there exists a discernable but nascent apparatus this
Article terms the global anti-xenophobia framework (or the Frame-
work). The term "framework" describes developing and increasingly
formalized structures of global cooperation to combat xenophobia.
27
The Framework presently falls short of a formal international regime
26. I offer the start of a proposal for a radical rethinking of sovereignty in rela-
tion to international migration elsewhere. See generally E. Tendayi Achiume, Re-Imag-
ining International Law for Global Migration: Migration as Decolonization?, 111 AM. J.
INT'L L. UNBoUND 142 (2017) (introducing a proposal for re-conceiving the movement of
certain migrants across international borders today as decolonization in order to achieve
a new and productive logic and ethics for international law's application to global migra-
tion, one that reflects global interconnectedness).
27. The term "global" refers to cooperation rooted in the United Nations frame-
work, which comprises 194 states, as opposed to the term "international," which also
applies to cooperation even only between two states.
[VOL.51:333342
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in the technical sense of the term.28 Because no description of this
emerging Framework exists in legal scholarship, this Part provides an
overview of its architecture and identifies: (1) the international treaty
law that states have agreed anchors existing international standards
28. An interdisciplinary literature on international regimes defines them as "so-
cial institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and pro-
grams that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas." Marc Levy, Oran
Young & Michael Ziirn, The Study of International Regimes, 1 EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 267,
274 (1995). Stephen Krasner defines a regime as "implicit or explicit principles, norms,
rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a
given area of international relations." Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Re-
gime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 INTL ORG. 185, 186 (1982). The
definition I adopt is a reformulation of Krasner's consensus definition by Marc A. Levy
that aims to mitigate criticisms that scholars have leveled at the Krasner definition.
Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons usefully define regimes as "multilateral agree-
ments among states which aim to regulate national actions within an issue area."
Stephan Haggard & Beth A. Simmons, Theories of International Regimes, 41 INT'L ORG.
491, 495. The global refugee regime is an example of a complex regime, see Karen J.
Alter & Sophie Meunier, The Politics of International Regime Complexity, 7
PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 13 (2009) ("International regime complexity refers to the
presence of nested, partially overlapping, and parallel international regimes that are not
hierarchically ordered."); Alexander Betts, Institutional Proliferation and the Global Ref-
ugee Regime, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 53, 55 (2009) (illustrating the refugee regime
complex, and describing the global migration complex), and the international human
rights regime is another. See Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime
Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599, 628-33 (1986) (conceptualizing single-issue human rights
regimes as nested within the broader international human rights regime). Scholars have
found it "useful to divide the process of regime formation into at least the following three
stages: agenda formation, institutional choice, and operationalization." Levy et al., supra
note 28, at 282. Agenda formation is "the emergence of an issue on the political agenda,
the framing of the issue for consideration in international forums, and the rise of the
issue to a high enough place on the international agenda to warrant priority treatment."
Id. (citing JANICE G. STEIN, GETTING TO THE TABLE: THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL
PRENEGOTIATION 115-40 (John Hopkins University Press 1989)). Institutional choice
moves beyond identification of a priority agenda item to agreement on the means of ad-
dressing it. See id. ("Institutional choice takes an issue from the point where it becomes
a priority item on the international agenda to the point of agreement on the provisions
of a specific regime."). And finally, operationalization refers to all the processes necessary
to implement the commitments agreed to on paper. See id. ("Operationalization covers
all those activities required to transform an agreement on paper into a functioning social
practice.") (citing HAROLD K. JACOBSON & EDITH BROWN WEISS, IMPLEMENTING AND
COMPLYING WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS: A FRAMEWORK FOR
RESEARCH (1990)). The Framework described in this Part includes agenda formation and
increasingly institutional choice determinations as UN bodies have initiated an anti-
xenophobia protocol drafting process. The fate of this latter process and of the entire
Framework remains to be determined. On the one hand, they may ultimately amount to
very little. But, on the other, a live option is that the Framework will continue to progress
towards deeper institutionalization and eventual operationalization. As a result, the
Framework may well be a regime precursor. Its status as a possible (and even likely)
regime-in-the-making warrants close attention to the Framework's normative and insti-
tutional commitments even at this early stage.
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applicable to regulating xenophobia, as well as the current anti-xeno-
phobia protocol proposal; (2) non-binding international declaratory in-
struments and policy initiatives that states have used to elaborate and
implement international anti-xenophobia standards; and (3) interna-
tional policy and guidance that multilateral bodies have used to elabo-
rate and implement international anti-xenophobia standards. After in-
troducing the Framework, the Article identifies its priorities and
highlights especially its conception of the appropriate role of interna-
tional law and policy in combating xenophobia.
International actors, namely states and multilateral bodies largely
within the United Nations, have officially articulated and located the
Framework within two different but related regimes: the international
human rights regime and, to a much lesser extent, the international
law and policy governing migration, including international refugee.
law. The Article begins with a discussion of the former.
A. International Human Rights Law on Equality and
Discrimination
As mentioned in the Introduction, no international treaty explic-
itly mentions xenophobia or xenophobic discrimination. However, in-
ternational actors have conceptualized the problem of xenophobia pri-
marily as an international human rights problem, and they have
designated international human rights law as the normative and reg-
ulatory anchor for global cooperation to address it.
29 Within interna-
tional human rights law, principles of equality, non-discrimination,
and tolerance currently supply the normative commitments of the
Framework. These principles of equality, non-discrimination, and tol-
erance are instantiated in legally binding provisions across multiple
international human rights treaties, and international actors have in-
creasingly marshalled these provisions to supply legal heft to the
Framework.30 An important example of such a provision is Article 26
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which es-
tablishes equality of all persons before the law and prohibits discrimi-
nation in equal protection of the law. It also "guarantee[s] to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
29. See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Contem-
porary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/50, TT 6-14 (2016) [hereinafter Rep. of the Special Rapporteur]




national or social origin, property, birth or other status."3 1 Interna-
tional actors thus-as an initial step-have pointed to pre-existing
equality and non-discrimination obligations such as these as including
international obligations to combat certain manifestations of xenopho-
bia.32
However, by far the most prominent international human rights
treaty regime in the Framework is the International Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).33 This treaty anchors
the global racial equality regime and provides the most comprehensive
framework at the international level for combating multiple forms of
discrimination and intolerance,34 which helps explain why this treaty
regime has been the most pronounced incubator of the Framework. Ar-
ticle 1.1 of ICERD prohibits racial discrimination, broadly defined as:
[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, de-
scent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or
any other field of public life. 3 5
31. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 26, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
32. See, e.g., Rep. of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 29, TT 6-14 (identifying
antidiscrimination provisions across various treaty regimes including the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, all applicable to the problem of xen-
ophobia); see also INT'L LABOR ORG. [ILO] ET AL., INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, RACISM,
DISCRIMINATION AND XENOPHOBIA 18-22 (2001), http://publications.iom.int/sys-
tem/files/pdf/international migration racism.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/978J-3SEW] (archived Jan. 20, 2018) [hereinafter International Migra-
tion] (identifying human rights equality and antidiscrimination provisions regulating
xenophobia).
33. ICERD entered into force in 1969 and is among the most widely ratified in-
ternational human rights treaties-at present it binds 177 states. International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S.
195, http://www.ohchr.org/ENfProfessionallnterest/Pages/CERD.aspx (last visited Jan.
20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/2VCL-TJ7D] (archived Jan. 20, 2018) [hereinafter ICERD];
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, Status of Ratifi-
cation Interactive Dashboard, http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/7B8U-ZJ2Z] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
34. The global anti-racism regime includes many references to "intolerance," but
this term has no legal definition in international law. In his seminal treatise on ICERD,
Natan Lerner defines it as describing "emotional, psychological, philosophical and reli-
gious attitudes that may cause discriminatory behavior and violations of religious free-
doms, as well as acts inspired by hate or hatred, persecutions and violence." NATAN
LERNER, THE UN CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION XII (rev. reprt. 2014).
35. ICERD, supra note 33, art. 1.1.
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Thus, under this treaty unlawful "racial" discrimination may occur on
grounds of ethnicity or national origin,36 for example, even where the
respective discriminatory purpose or effect does not implicate race
(narrowly construed) as a distinct social category. In addition to this
broad conception of racial discrimination incorporating multiple bases
of discrimination, ICERD is widely understood to apply to intersec-
tional discrimination-a defining feature of xenophobic discrimina-
tion.3 7 Notwithstanding the impressive breadth of Article 1.1, the ulti-
mate extent of ICERD's application to problems of xenophobia against
international migrants is complicated, and this Article returns to this
issue shortly.
Since the adoption of ICERD, the United Nations has hosted four
global conferences devoted to international action to combat racism,
racial discrimination, and eventually, related intolerance (the World
Conferences Against Racism or the WCARs).
38 From the very first
WCAR in 1978, this conference has always included statements of con-
cern for migrants that note their vulnerability to discrimination and
36. National origin and nationality differ in important respects notwithstanding
the regular overlap in the two. National origin variously refers to country of origin or
one's ancestry but nationality is a legal and political status. ICERD Art. 1.1 includes
national origin but not nationality. Id. For examples of xenophobic discrimination on the
basis of national origin as opposed to nationality, see Achiume, supra note 13, at 331-
32.
37. For a more detailed discussion of xenophobic discrimination as intersec-
tional, see Achiume, supra note 13, at 331-35. The UN Refugee Agency notes that invol-
untary migrants are subject to xenophobic harm "on the grounds of race, colour, descent,
national or ethnic origin, including in combination with other grounds, such as religion,
gender and disability[,]" as well as nationality. U.N. High Comm'r. for Refugees, Com-
bating Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance through a
Strategic Approach, ¶¶ 12 (Dec. 2009). The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination has affirmed ICERD's application to intersectional discrimination. See
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 25, Gen-
der related dimensions of racial discrimination, U.N. Doc. A/55/18, ¶ 1 (Mar. 20, 2000)
(noting that racial discrimination sometimes affects men and women differently and in
some circumstances affects women primarily or to a different degree). On the need for
an intersectional approach to discrimination, see Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Mar-
gins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 1241, 1251 (1991) (showing how the failure to account for oppression at the in-
tersection of social categories, when combined with institutions premised on noninter-
sectional contexts, can shape and subsequently compromise interventions on behalf of
persons located at these intersections).
38. Other UN conferences on human rights generally have also treated the issue
of racism such as the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights. This conference pro-
duced the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, which devotes a section to rac-
ism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance. World Conference
on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶¶ 20-65, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF/157/23 (June 25, 1993). Unlike the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights
and other international human rights conferences, however, the WCARs have had racial
and related discrimination and intolerance as their unique focus.
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intolerance.3 9 But it was not until the third WCAR, which was hosted
in Durban in 2001, that international actors put the problem of xeno-
phobia on the global agenda and initiated processes for global stand-
ard-setting on this issue. The WCARs before Durban were titled "World
Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination."40 Durban
was the first "World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimina-
tion, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance." According to one of the
state representatives involved in organizing the Durban WCAR, xeno-
phobia was included in the conference title "to make sure the confer-
ence would not avoid one of the worst social byproducts of economic
globalization."4 1
In the lead up to Durban, UN bodies and officers as well as inde-
pendent experts produced and reviewed research and analysis on the
problem of xenophobia on a scale previously unseen at the global
level.42 At the culmination of the conference, participating states
39. See, e.g., World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenopho-
bia and Related Intolerance, Report of the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Dis-
crimination, Xenophobia nd Related Intolerance, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12, ¶12 (2001)
[hereinafter Durban Declaration] (calling on states to eliminate discrimination against
migrant workers); World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, Re-
port of the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.92/40, at 7 (Aug. 1978) [hereinafter WCAR 1] (placing discrimination against
migrant workers on the conference agenda); see also Second World Conference to Combat
Racism and Racial Discrimination, Report of the Second World Conference to Combat
Racism and Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.119/26, at 24, 1 40 (1983) [here-
inafter WCAR II] ("[s]tates receiving migrant workers should eliminate all discrimina-
tory practices against such workers and their families."). Although both WCAR I and II
addressed discrimination and intolerance against migrants, the first WCAR report had
only one mention of xenophobia. WCAR I at 56. By the second WCAR in 1983, "xenopho-
bia" made it into the Programme of Action, which mentioned the term once in its exhor-
tations on the human rights of "persons belonging to minority groups, indigenous popu-
lations and migrant workers who are subjected to racial discrimination." See WCAR II
at 24, ¶ 40. The phrase "with a view to combating xenophobia, host countries should
develop information campaigns in order to disseminate the idea of equality between na-
tionals and migrant workers," was added at the suggestion of the Spanish delegate dur-
ing the drafting of the Programme of Action for this second WCAR. Id.
40. See WCAR I, supra note 39; WCAR II, supra note 39.
41. J. A. Lindgren Alves, The Durban Conference Against Racism and Everyone's
Responsibilities, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 971, 977 n.14 (2003).
42. For example, the International Labour Organization, the International Or-
ganization for Migration, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in consul-
tation with the UN Refugee Agency jointly produced a discussion paper titled Interna-
tional Migration, Racism, Discrimination and Xenophobia to help frame the treatment
of this issue at the conference. International Migration, supra note 32. At its various
sessions, the Preparatory Committee for the Durban WCAR reviewed a number of expert
reports and submissions on the problem of xenophobia, including a study titled Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Intolerance by the Special Rapporteur on the Human
Rights of Migrants, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.2/23 (2001), a report of the Expert Semi-
nar on Racism, Refugees and Multi-Ethnic States, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.1/9 (2000),
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adopted the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (DDPA).
The DDPA extensively references xenophobia. Notably, it recognizes
xenophobia as one of the main causes of racism and human rights vio-
lations against migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and non-nationals
generally.4 3 It reaffirms the responsibility of states to protect migrants
from acts of discrimination and violence that are "perpetrated with a
racist or xenophobic motivation[."j44 At Durban, states urged the adop-
tion of national action plans to combat racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance,45 and a number of states have
since developed such plans.46 At Durban, states also agreed on a need
to develop new global standards, complementary to ICERD, to better
address contemporary forms of discrimination and intolerance.
47
An important factor that may have aided the movement of xeno-
phobia to a position of some global priority was the desire of some
within the United Nations to get member states to respond to a range
of extreme acts of discrimination and intolerance that occurred in the
1990s.48 One hope was that pushing states at Durban to consider con-
temporary issues, including those relating to xenophobia, could avoid
and the Note by the Secretary-General Transmitting the Report of the Consultation on the
WCAR Held in Bellagio, Italy, 24-28 January 2000, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.1/10
(2000). Notably, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
stressed the need to address "widespread" xenophobia in Europe, which principally tar-
geted refugees and migrants. Proposals for the Work of the World Conference against
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance: Working Paper
Submitted by Mr. Paulo Sdrgio Pinheiro, Member of the Sub-Commission, in Accordance
with Sub-Commission Resolutions 1998/6 and 1999/6, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.189/PC.1/13/Add.1 (2000).
43. Durban Declaration, supra note 39, at 7, T 16.
44. Id. at 11, ¶ 48. Paragraphs 24-34 of the Programme of Action detail commit-
ments specifically to address racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related in-
tolerance against migrants and paragraphs 34-36 address the same but with respect to
refugees. Id. at 25-28.
45. Id. at 32.
46. See generally CARYN ABRAHAMS ET AL., PATHWAYS TO ANTIRACISM (Caryn
Abrahams ed. 2017), http://www.gero.ac.zalmedia/reportsfPathways-toAntirac-
ismREPORT_005 Lxz9ZjL.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2018) [https://perma.cclLSA5-
YA9U] (archived Jan. 20, 2018) (reviewing the NAPs of Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Cro-
atia, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Malta, Mexico, Slovak Republic and Spain).
47. Durban Declaration, supra note 39, at 58, ¶ 199.
48. For example, the UN officer credited with proposing the Durban WCAR ex-
plained that part of the motivation of was the desire for a global response to issues in
the 1990s such as:
[A]cts of aggression against immigrants in Europe; [] the resurgence of white
supremacist doctrines that inspired armed 'militias' in the United States; [] in-
tertribal killings in Africa which had reached a genocidal frenzy in the case of
[VOL. 51:333348
GOVERNING XENOPHOBIA
the explosiveness of historically controversial issues that had domi-
nated the early WCARs, and undermined global consensus by dividing
states in acrimonious political disagreement.4 9 This turned out not to
be the case. The anti-Semitic vitriol of a small but vocal minority of
actors dominated coverage of the Durban conference as well as much
of the post-conference commentary.5 0 And while Israel-Palestine issues
were the most explosive at Durban, other contentious debates at the
conference rehearsed persisting disagreement and contestation among
states about the meaning of racism and racial discrimination and the
appropriate role of global intervention to combat it. All four WCARs,
including the one at Durban, have been deeply controversial as a result
Rwanda; [] aggravated Asian ethnic-religious conflicts, with killings and dese-
cration of temples; [] the violence and hooliganism of skinheads and growing neo-
Nazi groups on both sides of the Atlantic [and] ... ; in the expansion of Fascist-
like micro-nationalism often translated into practices of 'ethnic cleansing' and
bloody wars.
Lindgren Alves, supra note 41, at 976.
49. See Corinne Lennox, Reviewing Durban: Examining the Outputs and Review
of the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, 27 NETHERLANDS Q. OF HUM. RTS. 191,
197 (2009) ("[The Sub-Commission] hoped a focus on contemporary issues of racism, ra-
cial discrimination, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance would be a forward look-
ing venture . . .").
50. The Durban WCAR was marred by deep conflict among states (and even
among NGO-par-ticipants) on the Israel-Palestine issue that was only made worse by the
violent backdrop of the Second Intifada underway before and during the conference. For
an overview of the Second Intifada, see Jeremy Pressman, The Second Intifada: Back-
ground and Causes of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 23 J. Conflict Studies (2003),
https://journals.lib.unb.calindex.php/jcs/article/view/220/378 [https://perma.cc/WK2R-
FQK5] (archived Jan. 20, 2018). For an assessment of the issues raised by the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict at Durban, see Gay McDougall, The World Conference Against Rac-
ism: Through a Wider Lens, 26 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFFAIRS 135, 143-47 (2002).
The United States and Israel walked out of the Durban negotiations in protest. A minor-
ity but offensive and inflammatory presence at Durban engaged in anti-Semitic intimi-
dation of Jewish groups present at the conference. Notwithstanding the shadow cast by
incidents such as these, Durban should be largely remembered for its positive achieve-
ments, which were more representative of the vast majority of conference participants.
These achievements are captured well in an essay by Gay McDougall, the first American
member of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ("CERD. Id. at
139-42 (describing how the Durban WCAR, among other things, grappled with the his-
torical and structural conditions of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance; made important statements about the face of racism today; expanded the
knowledge base of contemporary issues relating to racial discrimination; and laid plans
for action around areas of common ground). For an assessment of Durban as flawed but
more successful than prior WCARs, see Lennox, supra note 49, at 201 ("Durban offered
important opportunities for recognition and change . . . [but] was not perfect in its exe-
cution or outcome."). For a negative assessment of Durban from the perspective of a legal
advisor to the US delegation for Durban, see Christopher N. Camponovo, Disaster in
Durban: The United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, 34 GEO. WASH. INT`L L. REV. 659 (2003).
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of the prominence at each of some or a number of the following issues:
the legacies of slavery and colonialism, including the question of repa-
rations; the existence of apartheid in South Africa, including disagree-
ment over global isolation of the racist regime when it was in power,
as well as the legitimacy of armed struggle against it; and Israel's un-
lawful occupation of Palestinian territories and the rights of Palestini-
ans within or seeking to return to Israel.51 Disagreement of this sort
dates back even to the negotiation of ICERD itself, and has typically
fallen along the same geopolitical fault lines, regularly pitting First
World states and their allies on the one hand, against Second and
Third World states on the other.5 2 Debates on xenophobia have played
themselves out similarly.
In 2006, the United Nations Human Rights Council established a
committee tasked with developing a new international treaty or proto-
col complementary to ICERD.53 By doing so, the Council aimed finally
to implement the international commitment secured in Durban to re-
vamp the global anti-discrimination and anti-intolerance framework in
51. For a brief review and one perspective on this controversy over the course of
the four WCARs, see Lennox, supra note 49, at 192-205.
52. See generally Ofra Friesel, Race Versus Religion in the Making of the Inter-
national Convention Against Racial Discrimination, 32 L. & HIST. REV. 351 (1965) (dis-
cussing the political issues that pitted the First World on the one hand, and the Second
and Third on the other, in ICERD negotiations);. see also Lennox supra note 49, at 194-
95 (recounting the salience of colonialism and its legacy in state debates to ICERD's
adoption in 1965). I use the terms "First," "Second," and "Third" "World" as others have
"to try to capture the sense of [each] as ... political grouping[s] rather than ... putatively
'objective' demographic[s] or economic coalition[s]." SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING
INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, EcONOMIc GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF
UNIVERSALITY 261 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011). See id. at 261-62 for a useful, short
note on the Third World as a political project. The First world roughly describes indus-
trialized capitalist countries that were the main beneficiaries of the European colonial
project. The Second World refers to former Communist countries, and the Third World
refers roughly to the former European colonies in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
53. U. N. Human Rights Council Decision 3/103, taken in December 2006, estab-
lished an Ad Hoc Committee of the Human Rights Council on the Elaboration of Com-
plementary Standards, and the inaugural session of this Committee was convened in
2008, pursuant to a subsequent resolution, Elaboration of International Complementary
Standards to the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/6/21 (Sept. 28, 2007), http://ap.ohchr.org/Docu-
ments/E/HRC/resolutions/A.HRCRES_6_21.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/WQ2Q-BRJL] (archived Jan. 20, 2018). This resolution convening the
first session of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Human Rights Council on the Elaboration
of Complementary Standards made specific reference to the salience of the problem of
xenophobia. Id. (reporting states: "deep[] alarm[] at the sharp increase in xenophobic
tendencies and intolerance towards various racial and religious groups and cultures,
where people belonging to minorities, migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and illegal mi-
grants are the worst affected victims of such tendencies and acts[.]").
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accordance with contemporary challenges ostensibly not contemplated
at the time of ICERD's adoption.54
The Ad Hoc Committee of the Human Rights Council on the Elab-
oration of Complementary Standards' proceedings provide the most ex-
plicit, formal articulation of the positions of states and key regional
bodies such as the African Union, the European Union, the Organiza-
tion of American States, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
on how international law regulates xenophobia.55 On at least six occa-
sions the Ad Hoc Committee has facilitated state consultations on the
international standards applicable to xenophobia and domestic imple-
mentation of these standards.56 The debates of the Ad Hoc Committee
show that, far from being issues amenable to easy consensus, xenopho-
bia and its global regulation have reproduced familiar fissures and ge-
opolitical configurations in this latest chapter of global intervention on
discrimination and intolerance.5 7
Although the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee per the Durban
Declaration and Programme of Action is to propose new standards, the
Committee has spent the bulk of its time on the question of whether in
the first place, new standards are necessary to complement ICERD.
More precisely, it has been occupied with debating whether the prob-
54. U.N. Human Rights Council Decision 3/103 (2006) [hereinafter Decision
3/103]. Paragraph 199 of the Durban Programme of Action recommends that that the
now-Human Rights Council "prepare complementary international standards to
strengthen and update international instruments against racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance in all their aspects[.]" Durban Declaration, supra
note 39, at 58.
55. All forty-seven member states of the UN Human Rights Council may partic-
ipate in the activities of the Ad Hoc Committee. In addition, the Committee invites rep-
resentatives of regional bodies such as the African Union, the European Union, the Or-
ganization of American States, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to
participate in its proceedings. See Decision 3/103, supra note 54.
56. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards on
Its Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Sessions each facilitated state con-
sultations. See 9th Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards, Pro-
gramme of Work (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Rac-
ism/AdHoc/9thsession/pow.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2018) [https://perma.cc/8D5W-
BS8P] (archived Jan. 20, 2018) (schedule for the ninth Ad Hoc Committee listing consul-
tations on xenophobia); U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/74, ¶ 14 (Feb. 26, 2016); U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/28/81, ¶¶ 45, 89, 133 (Jan. 30, 2015); U.N. Doc. AJHRC/25/69, IT 73-74 (Mar. 14,
2014); U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/59, I¶ 90-91 (Aug. 31, 2012); U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/36, ¶¶ 22-
33 (Sept. 6, 2011).
57. This Article focuses on contention specifically with respect to complementary
standards on xenophobia but controversy shrouds the more general question of comple-
mentary standards on racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.
See Lennox, supra note 49, at 218-20 (discussing contention surrounding complemen-
tary standards to ICERD generally).
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lem of xenophobia is sufficiently captured in ICERD's definition of ra-
cial discrimination, or whether instead this problem presents novel
forms of discrimination and intolerance requiring novel standards.
There are three general positions.
The majority of states expressing views have taken the position
that additional, xenophobia-specific standards are necessary for an in-
ternational regime fully equipped to deal with contemporary manifes-
tations of xenophobia. States in this camp are largely from the Third
World. On their view, the problem of xenophobia today surpasses the
parameters of protection from racial discrimination as defined by Arti-
cle 1 of ICERD, even if this definition offers some useful means for
combatting xenophobia. Some advocate additional standards to re-
spond to what they perceive to be more prevalent manifestations of
xenophobia than previously existed. Other states argue that contem-
porary manifestations of xenophobia are qualitatively different from
what is covered by Article 1. States supporting additional standards
also express concern that the lack of an international legal definition
inhibits consistency and transparency across national jurisdictions in
the regulation of xenophobia.58 Ultimately, the majority view is that
ICERD is good, but not good enough.
On the other end of the spectrum are states that outright reject the
need for additional international standards. On their view, the prob-
lem of xenophobia raises no sufficiently novel challenges as to warrant
additional international law standards. States adopting this view have
been predominantly western European and North American countries,
and they challenge the utility even of formal articulation of the inter-
national legal prohibition of xenophobia.5 9 The European Union and
the United States, for example, have strongly opposed claims that
there is a "legal vacuum" or "large gaps in the normative standards" at
the international level.60 According to the European Union, "xenopho-
bia could be understood through other grounds of discrimination and
in connection with racism and racial discrimination, and could be a
compounding or additional ground for discrimination."61 According to
58. Examples of states that have supported additional standards include Vene-
zuela, South Africa, and Morocco. Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of Com-
plementary Standards on Its Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/59, ¶¶ 23, 35, 54 (Aug.
31, 2012).
59. According to the EU representative, "a legal definition [is] not really neces-
sary to deal with the phenomenon of xenophobia and that the definition contained in
[ICERD is] sufficient to deal with the issues of xenophobia." Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm.
on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards on Its Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/18/36, ¶ 58 (Sept. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Third Session].
60. Id. TT 74-75.
61. Id. ¶ 43.
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the United States, "[t]he prohibited grounds for discrimination out-
lined in [ICERD are] broad enough to cover manifestations of xenopho-
bia based on those protected grounds[,]"62 and ICERD already prohib-
its "xenophobic violence and discrimination."6 3
Finally, there are states that take an intermediary position-they
have expressed uncertainty that the absence of a legal definition at the
international level is of any consequence across and within national
jurisdictions.64 These states instead have suggested that CERD issue
an official opinion clarifying "how provisions in [ICERD] could be ap-
plied to issues related to xenophobia and how they had been addressed
in practice[.]"6 5
Which view is correct? Two doctrinal issues definitely undermine
ICERD's capacity comprehensively to address the contemporary prob-
lem of xenophobia. The first is its ambivalent treatment of discrimina-
tion on the basis of citizenship, and the second is the absence of religion
from Article 1's otherwise broad definition of racial discrimination. As
a result of these two issues, it is difficult to discern formal consensus
among states on the precise content of the anti-xenophobia norms or
ideals that ICERD advances.66
As a general matter, what distinguishes xenophobic actions and
attitudes from other intolerant actions and attitudes is that the former
target persons on grounds of foreignness, a category whose treatment
under ICERD is not fully determined by the text. Elsewhere I have
elaborated foreignness as "the status of being an actual or perceived
outsider to a given political community," and, significantly, the con-
struction of foreignness rests on multiple, overlapping classifications,67
even where international migrants are concerned. For this group, the
relevant membership unit is typically though not exclusively the na-
tion-state, which means that the grounds of xenophobic discrimination
62. Id. $ 48.
63. The United States representative stated that the existing definition of racial
discrimination in ICERD "prohibited xenophobic violence and discrimination," making
any attempts to pursue new definitions "dangerous." Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. on the
Elaboration of Complementary Standards on Its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/69,
¶ 42 (Mar. 14, 2014).
64. Examples of states that have taken this position include Japan, Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Switzerland. Id. T 39.
65. Id.
66. The line between permissible and condemnable anti-foreigner attitudes,
practices, policies, and structures in official state consideration of xenophobia remains
remarkably fuzzy. For example, France has stated within the Ad Hoc Committee that:
"xenophobia [is] essentially about treating those of another nationality differently."
Third Session, supra note 59, T 45. Yet it is inconceivable that France would characterize
all differential treatment of non-nationals as xenophobic.
67. For a detailed discussion of the definition and meaning of foreignness where
xenophobia is concerned, see Achiume, supra note 13, at 331-34.
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against international migrants will include national origin and/or na-
tionality or citizenship status. Refugees and others forced to move
across international borders are constructed and targeted as foreign on
the basis of their nationality combined with other social categories, the
most important of which include race, ethnicity, religion, and class.
68
Religion plays an important role in determining one's vulnerability
to xenophobic discrimination and exclusion. Recent examples include
actual and aspirational state policy in Europe and the United States
that is discussed in the next Part, and that openly opposes admission
of refugees on the basis of the religion of refugees (actual or imputed).
A Christian Syrian refugee and a Muslim Syrian refugee are likely to
face very different receptions in these regions, making religion a sali-
ent marker of foreigner status in this example.
Although Article 1.1 of ICERD defines prohibited racial discrimi-
nation broadly, it makes no mention of religion as a basis for prohibited
racial discrimination. In fact, UN member states deliberately excluded
the mention of religion in Article 1 after heated disputes regarding this
issue almost derailed the entire effort to achieve an anti-racial discrim-
ination treaty.69 This opens the door to questions as to the extent of
ICERD's application, for example, to a scenario where a state adopts a
policy permitting admission of black Nigerian forced migrants who are
Christian but not those who are Muslim.70 As just alluded to, the rela-
tionship between racial and religious discrimination is complex and
has been the subject of long and contentious debates among UN mem-
ber states. In the lead up to ICERD's adoption, a central and divisive
debate centered on whether racial and religious discrimination ought
to be addressed by a single treaty, or whether it was more prudent to
deal with each separately.7 i Ultimately states agreed to separate the
68. See Achiume, supra note 13, at 331-35 (discussing foreignness as a basis for
discrimination).
69. See Friesel supra note 52 (discussing the contentious debates surrounding
race and religion in ICERD negotiation and in the lead up to these negotiations).
70. If these forced migrants were refugees, such discrimination on the basis of
religion would be prohibited for states bound by international refugee law, which pro-
hibits discrimination against refugees on the basis of religion. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees art. 3, July 28, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Con-
vention]. For all other involuntary migrants, the extent of legally prohibited religious
discrimination against non-nationals where territorial admission is concerned is equiv-
ocal at best.
71. See LERNER, supra note 34, at 3-8 (summarizing the discussion on whether




two, motivated predominantly by political strategy.72 They moved for-
ward with ICERD, but no treaty devoted to religious discrimination
and intolerance as yet exists.
While ICERD does not mention religion as a basis for prohibited
racial discrimination, CERD has found that Article 1 may apply to
cases involving religious discrimination where the targeted individ-
ual(s) belong to identifiable ethnic minority groups.7 3 This is helpful
when xenophobic discrimination involving religion targets a group that
is also ethnically defined, but as another has argued, this latter condi-
tion is not always met in real word cases of xenophobic discrimina-
tion.74 One widely held view is that additional guidance from CERD on
religious discrimination and intolerance under ICERD, in addition to
protections found in the ICCPR, would be sufficient to address any ex-
isting normative gaps with respect to religion.7 5 This Article takes no
72. See generally Friesel, supra note 52 (providing a detailed account of the Cold
War politics that pitted the United States, Britain and Israel against the USSR and the
Third World in this debate).
73. For an analysis of CERD jurisprudence involving religious discrimination
that reaches this conclusion, see Stephanie E. Berry, Bringing Muslim Minorities within
the International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination-
Square Peg in a Round Hole?, 11 Hum. RTS. L. REV. 423, 431-36, 450 (2011); see also
Patrick Thornberry, Forms of Hate Speech and the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), 5 RELIGION & HUM. RTS. 97 (2010) (for a sim-
ilar analysis from a former CERD commissioner). It is important to note that religious
and racial discrimination are not always conceptually or even practically severable. For
example, Muneer Ahmad has compellingly argued the point that animus targeting Mus-
lims in the United States is often racialized animus, deployed on the basis of racial as-
criptions as opposed to faith or behavior. See Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared By Law:
Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1278
(2004) ("[T]he 'Muslim-looking' construct is neither religion- nor conduct-based."). This
insight is applicable beyond the borders of the United States, where animus targeting
Muslims is often racialized animus. See, e.g., Berry, supra, at 446 (arguing this point in
the European context); see also Emmanuel Maule6n, Black Twice: Policing Black Muslim
Identities, 65 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming June 2018)(arguing the inherent racialization
of religion).
74. See Berry, supra note 73, at 439-46 (discussing shortcomings in CERD's ju-
risprudential approach for Muslims in Europe).
75. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Council, Complementary International Standards Com-
pilation of Conclusions and Recommendations of the Study by the Five Experts on the
Content and Scope of Substantive Gaps in the Existing International Instruments to
Combat Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/AC.1/1/CRP.4, ¶¶ 48-50, 130 (Feb. 18, 2008) [hereinafter A/HRC/AC.1/1/CRP.4]
(finding that the nexus between racism and religion is not sufficiently dealt with under
international law but that a new General Recommendation from CERD and a new Gen-
eral Comment from the ICCPR's Human Rights Committee would address the problem;
and that "religious intolerance combined with racial and xenophobic prejudices is ade-
quately covered under international human rights instruments); Carolyn Evans, Time
for a Treaty? The Legal Sufficiency of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and Discrimination, 2007 BYU L. REV. 617, 619 (2007) ("[A] new treaty is
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position on this more general question of the adequacy of international
standards applicable to religious discrimination and intolerance. But
on the narrower question of religiously informed xenophobic discrimi-
nation, guidance from CERD in the form of a General Recommendation
would definitely contribute needed clarity as to the extent of ICERD's
application.
Even if a CERD General Recommendation might alleviate con-
cerns relating to religious discrimination and intolerance, the same
cannot as easily be said of the thornier issue of non-national or citizen-
ship status. At the time of ICERD's drafting, states took great pains to
distinguish national origin from nationality or citizenship in the defi-
nition of prohibited racial discrimination.7 6 On the one hand, national
origin discrimination is prohibited racial discrimination under ICERD
not warranted at this time and it would be more fruitful to strengthen current mecha-
nisms in order to protect religious freedom.").
76. Footnote 36 above distinguishes national origin from nationality, but a fur-
ther difference exists between citizenship and nationality in international law. From a
public international law perspective, nationality is an outward facing concept, determin-
ing "the scope of application of basic rights and obligations of states vis-A-vis other states
and the international community, such as personal jurisdiction, application of treaties,
and claims of protection." Kay Hailbronner, Nationality, in MIGRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 75 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Vincent Chetail eds., 2003).
Citizenship, on the other hand, is an inward facing concept that concerns the rights and
duties of the individual internal to and determined by her political community. For a
useful and detailed analysis of citizenship in international law, see Peter J. Spiro, A New
International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 694 (2011). Although the terms
"citizenship" and "nationality" are often used interchangeable, citizenship-based dis-
crimination can differ from nationality-based discrimination. Citizenship-based discrim-
ination tracks differential treatment of non-citizens relative to citizens. Nationality dis-
crimination, on the other hand, may entail differential treatment among non-citizens of
different nationalities, for example policies that might favour British nationals over
Zambian nationals in admission policies. For involuntary migrants, the xenophobic dis-
crimination they experience implicates both citizenship status and nationality in the
strict sense of both. As non-citizens they are targeted as political outsiders. But in addi-
tion, specific nationalities are at higher risk of xenophobic exclusion than others. The
Trump Administration Executive Order targeting nationals of Muslim-majority coun-
tries offers an example.
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Article 1.1." But ICERD treats nationality-7 8 and citizenship-based
discrimination differently. Article 1.2 of ICERD provides: "This Con-
vention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or pref-
erences made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and
non-citizens." This provision on its face creates a carve-out seemingly
permitting states wide discretion lawfully to discriminate on the basis
of citizenship. This introduces significant ambiguity as to the global
baseline of prohibited xenophobic discrimination. The body established
by ICERD to monitor treaty implementation has advanced a narrow
interpretation of the citizenship or alienage carve out, stating that "dif-
ferential treatment based on citizenship or immigration status will
constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged
in the light of the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are not
applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the
achievement of this aim."79 This guidance is helpful and important. But
ultimately it leaves too large a grey zone where it is instead necessary
to have clearer definition of the parameters of internationally prohib-
ited and condemned manifestations of xenophobia.80
ICERD can be read to impose significant obligations on state par-
ties to combat facets of the problem of xenophobia, and this is an im-
portant point that should not be eclipsed by the critique advanced
here.81 But even from a technical perspective that sets aside questions
77. Even after distinguishing national origin from citizenship and nationality,
states expressed very different views on the meaning of national origin, revealing varia-
tions in the complex and myriad relations among ethnicity, political community and
statehood that countries regarded as salient. The debates of state delegates to the Third
Committee of the General Assembly provide an illustration. See Third Committee of the
General Assembly, 1307th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1307 (Oct. 18, 1965); Third Com-
mittee of the General Assembly, 1306th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1306 (Oct. 15,
1965); Third Committee of the General Assembly, 1305th Meeting, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR. 1305 (Oct. 14, 1965); Third Committee of the General Assembly, 1304th Meet-
ing, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1304 (Oct. 14, 1965).
78. With respect to nationality discrimination, ICERD provides the following:
"Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provi-
sions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided
that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality." ICERD, su-
pra note 33, at art. 1.3.
79. U.N. Committee On The Elimination Of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Gen-
eral Recommendation 30: Discrimination Against Non Citizens, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3, T 4 (Oct. 1, 2002).
80. Consider, for example, that in his treatise on ICERD, Natan Lerner's assess-
ment of the treaty is that it does not "interfere in the internal legislation of any State as
far as differences in the rights of citizens and non-citizens are concerned[.]" LERNER,
supra note 34, at 35. But see Achiume, supra note 13 (arguing a different perspective).
81. In Beyond Prejudice, for example, I argue that ICERD provides a legal basis
for prohibition of certain forms of structural xenophobic discrimination. See Achiume,
supra note 13, at 327.
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of deep emancipatory potential, ICERD has limitations that vindicate
the position of states in support of additional standards. Complemen-
tary standards (if achievable) could contribute much-needed clarity re-
garding the content of global anti-xenophobia norms,
8 2 which is im-
portant for both expressive and instrumental reasons.
8 3 This
assessment sets aside the independent but important question of the
overall strategic prudence of attempting such reform in a global cli-
mate heavily riddled with populist nationalism.
To be clear, the legal positions of states on whether additional anti-
xenophobia standards are necessary also reflect politics that are not
explicitly articulated in the formal Ad Hoc Committee debates. For ex-
ample, the opposition of the European Union to new global standards
on xenophobia should seem curious given that this body has, at the
82. In this respect I reach a different conclusion from the expert body that con-
sidered the question of complementary standards prior to the Ad Hoc Committee, and
determined that additional guidance from CERD would suffice to address "the absence
of an explicit incorporation of acts of xenophobia and related intolerance in international
instruments[.]" AIHRC/AC.1/1/CRP.4, supra note 75, ¶ 58. In my view, norm clarification
at the level of states is necessary, even though the current climate suggests that norma-
tive consensus among states would be difficult to achieve.
83. One function of norm creation at the international level is expressive. In this
sense, international norms make important statements about shared values and funda-
mental ideal commitments. For a discussion of expressive theory in the context of inter-
national law, see Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive Inter-
national Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 77 (2007). The expressive content of international norms
directly shapes the expressive content of regional and domestic laws all over the world.
This is already true of the global anti-xenophobia norms that international actors have
begun articulating using international human rights law. For example, the African Un-
ion's regional migration framework incorporates by reference international human
rights norms applicable to xenophobia. The Migration Policy Framework for Africa, Ex-
ecutive Council, Ninth Ordinary Session, EX.CL/276 (IX), at 25-26 (June 2006) (calling
on AU member states to, "harmonize national legislation with international convention"
to ensure the protection of the rights of migrants; recommending that AU member states
implement the Programme of Action of the World Conference Against Racism and
Xenophobia (2001) which is based on the International Convention for the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination; and urging international migration and human rights
organizations to coordinate anti-xenophobia activities).
Insofar as global norm creation is pursued for instrumentalist aims-e.g. eliminating
or reducing xenophobic conflict-any description or evaluation of these consequentialist
aspirations rests in important part on expressive statements about "what consequences
count and how they should be described." Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function
of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2048 (1996). Further, where norms are introduced in-
strumentally to shift pre-existing norms and thereby influence behavior "the most effec-
tive use of [these new] norms is ex ante." Id. at 2030. Their potential rests in part on
embedding in the norm clear cues for behavior or circumstances that would actually ad-
dress the problem the norm seeks to counter. There is much to be gained from more
clearly defined global anti-xenophobia norms.
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regional level, developed the most comprehensive anti-xenophobia le-
gal framework in existence today.84 But EU opposition is likely moti-
vated in part by the more longstanding unease of First World countries
about the possible implications of a treaty process dedicated to revamp-
ing the global anti-racist machinery given, for example, questions of
colonial reparations and other contentious issues raised at Durban.
Furthermore, debates on complementary standards relating to xeno-
phobia within the Ad Hoc Committee came hot off the heels of even
more contentious debates regarding complementary standards on reli-
gious intolerance.85 The quest for new standards on religious defama-
tion and intolerance has been championed most strongly by the OJC,
with the support of the African and Asian groups, and in the face of
strong opposition from the First World.8 6 Thus for the First World, the
push for complementary standards on xenophobia may seem too much
84. The only existing treaty on xenophobia is regionally originated-the Council
of Europe's Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime Concerning the Crimi-
nalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer
Systems. This treaty is open for ratification and accession by Council of Europe member
states and non-member states that are parties to Council of Europe's Convention on Cy-
bercrime. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Crimi-
nalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed Through Computer
Systems, Jan. 28, 2003, C.E.T.S. No. 189; see also Counsel of Europe, Details of Treaty
No. 189, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/189 (last
visited Jan. 21, 2018) [https://perma.ccl77KY-6DUJ] (archived Jan. 21, 2018). The EU
has also promulgated Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on Combatting Cer-
tain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law which
"aims to approximate national criminal laws so that the same racist or xenophobic be-
havior constitutes an offence in all [EU] Member States[.]" Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. on
the Elaboration of Complementary Standards on Its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/25/69, ¶ 40 (Mar. 14, 2014).
85. For a discussion of the history and substance of debates on complementary
standards on defamation, including within the context of the Ad Hoc Committee, see
Dimitrina Petrova, 'Smoke and Mirrors' The Durban Review Conference and Human
Rights Politics at the United Nations, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV., 129, 133-38 (2010). Accord-
ing to Robert Blitt, the Ad Hoc Committee moved forward with discussion of xenophobia
after discussions on religious defamation and incitement imploded. See Robert C. Blitt,
Defamation of Religion: Rumors of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 62 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 347, 367 (2011) ("[Ultimately, the Ad Hoc Committee could only agree to move
forward on discussions relating to the topic of xenophobia."). The compelling criticisms
of the push for international standards on religious defamation include concerns that the
proposed formulations of these standards would result in international protection of ex-
isting blasphemy laws that threaten freedom of expression, and also undermine the very
right to religious freedom. For analysis of the freedom of expression and freedom of reli-
gion concerns raised by the religious defamation "campaign," see Blitt, supra note 85;
Leonard A. Leo, Felice D. Gaer & Elizabeth K. Cassidy, Protecting Religions from Defa-
mation: A Threat to Universal Human Rights Standards, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
769, 771-83 (2011) (discussing the defamation of religions concept).
86. Petrova, supra note 85, at 133-34; see also Blitt, supra note 85 (providing a
detailed history of the religious defamation debate).
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like a process through which familiar contentious proposals might gain
new life. Complementary standards on xenophobia might also threaten
overly expansive and discriminatory anti-terrorism mechanisms that
these countries have pursued post-9/11 and that are widely recognized
as raising serious human rights concerns.
8 7
The strong support of Third World states for complementary stand-
ards should be seen to some extent as part of a tradition beginning with
ICERD of pushing forward global anti-racism standards. It should not
be forgotten that in the first place, political considerations often led
First World states-especially the United States-to take action that
undermined progress towards a global treaty on racial discrimination
prior to ICERD.8 8 At the same time, however, the support for comple-
mentary standards on xenophobia, at least for a minority of countries,
may reflect particular interests.8 9
Despite the decade-long stalemate within the Ad Hoc Committee,
the Durban goal of achieving additional standards recently moved
closer to reality. In March 2017, a resolution by the UN Human Rights
Council implementing an earlier directive of the UN General Assembly
effectively overrode the stalemate in the Ad Hoc Committee.o This res-
olution initiated the drafting of an international protocol criminalizing
87. For example, in a report to UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the
Council of Europe acknowledged that counter-terrorism measure in the region had
played a role in making Muslim communities more vulnerable to discrimination and in-
tolerance. Letter Dated 19 December 2008 from the Secretary-General of the Council of
Europe Addressed to the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Transmitting a Written
Contribution of the Council of Europe to the Durban Review Conference, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.211/PC.4/6, ¶ 20 (Feb. 4, 2009).
88. See generally Friesel, supra note 52 (canvassing various politically motivated
attempts led by the United States to sideline race in favor of religion in the negotiation
of the convention).
89. On the one hand, Third World countries are defensibly concerned with anti-
Muslim and even Islamophobic discriminatory post-9/11 anti-terrorism measures and
this concern has likely motivated states in support of complementary standards. Lennox,
supra note 49, at 219 (citing this motivation for the position of the African and Arab
Groups on complementary standards to ICERD) and at 227-29 (providing an overview
of the Organization of Islamic Countries' efforts to have the UN do more to address Is-
lamophobia). On the other hand, some among these states may also motivated by inde-
fensible attempts to create international cover for religious persecution occurring nation-
ally through enforcement of controversial blasphemy laws. For example, a detailed
discussion of how enforcement of the concept of defamation of religion as applied in one
country has resulted in human rights violations against minorities, see Javaid Rehman
& Stephanie E. Berry, Is "Defamation of Religions" Passd? The United Nations, Organi-
sation of Islamic Cooperation, and Islamic State Practices: Lessons from Pakistan, 44
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 431, 453-67 (2012).
90. This resolution of the UN Human Rights Council "implement[s] the request
of General Assembly contained in its resolution 71/181 by requesting the Chair-Rappor-
teur of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Human Rights Council on the Elaboration of Com-
plementary Standards to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
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acts of a racist and xenophobic nature, about which the Article will say
more shortly. This protocol, if adopted, would be the first global treaty
dedicated at its inception specifically to the problem of xenophobia.
B. Ancillary Processes and Architecture in the International Law and
Policy of Cross-Border Movement
The scale of recent involuntary displacement and its impact on the
world's powerful countries-including the xenophobic backlash it en-
gendered-have generated momentum for the most concerted effort to
reform the global governance of migration to date.9 1 This global activity
relating to large movements of refugees and migrants has precipitated
anti-xenophobia initiatives outside the ICERD regime. These initia-
tives should be seen as part of the Framework.
In December 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution
calling for a meeting of the heads of all UN member states for the pur-
pose of "addressing large movements of refugees and migrants."92 Ac-
cording to the United Nations, so-called large movements of refugees
and migrants are defined not in terms of some absolute number but
rather on the basis of the geographic context, capacities of the receiving
states, and the impact of the suddenness or prolonged nature of such
movements on receiving states.9 3 These cross-border movements are
of Racial Discrimination to ensure the commencement of the negotiations on the draft
additional protocol to the Convention criminalizing acts of a racist and xenophobic na-
ture during the tenth session of the Ad Hoc Committee[.]" Elaboration of Complementary
Standards to the International Convention on the Eliminations of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/L.31/Rev.1, T 1 (Mar. 21, 2017).
91. By the first half of 2015, about 21 million people had crossed international
borders in search of refuge from conflict, persecution and generalized violence or human
rights violations. And by the end of 2015, 65.3 million people "were displaced from their
homes by conflict and persecution[,]" the highest figure on record and a significant in-
crease from 59.5 million the year before. Adrian Edwards, Global Forced Displacement
Hits Record High, UNHCR: THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY (June 20, 2016), http://www.un-
her.org/en-us/news/latest/20 16/6/5763b65a4/global-forced-displacement-hits-record-
high.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2018) [https://perma.c/H7Y8-2GLD] (archived Jan. 21,
2018).
92. G.A. Res. A/70/49 (II), at 14, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view-doc.asp?sym-
bol=A/70/49(vol.ii) (last visited Jan. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/945M-2L8W] (archived
Jan. 21, 2018) (Decision 70/539(a) - High-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly
on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants).
93. See U.N. Secretary-General, In Safety and Dignity: Addressing Large Move-
ments of Refugees and Migrants, U.N. Doc. A/70/59, ¶ 11 (Apr. 21, 2016) [hereinafter
U.N. Doc. A/70/59] ("Whether a movement is characterized as 'large' is less dependent
on the absolute number of people moving than on its geographical context, the capacities
of the receiving State to respond, and the impact . . . on the receiving country."); New
York Declaration, supra note 19, T 6 ('"[L]arge movements' may be understood to reflect
a number of considerations.").
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comprised of people who move for different reasons, and these move-
ments are disorderly, unsafe, and "irregular"
94 in that they occur
through unofficial or informal channels, often violating the policies of
receiving states.
This General Assembly resolution relating to large movements was
taken in the wake of a four-month period of chaotic, large-scale invol-
untary migration to Europe and the serious xenophobic and other back-
lash that followed. When the meeting to address large movements
eventually took place in New York in September 2016, it resulted in
the adoption by heads of UN member states of the New York Declara-
tion. The New York Declaration is especially significant, because in
recognition of today's "unprecedented level of human mobility"
95 it does
two things. First, it initiates reform of the global refugee regime, which
is to culminate with the 2018 adoption of a new agreement: the Global
Compact for Refugees.9 6 Secondly, it initiates an intergovernmental
consultative process that is to culminate with the 2018 adoption of the
first international agreement devoted to reform of global governance of
migration: the Global Compact on Migration.
9 7
International actors have linked the problem of xenophobia to the
need for reform of global involuntary migration governance. In the lead
up to the New York meeting of heads of states, the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral produced a report that among other things highlighted xenopho-
bia, discrimination, and resulting marginalization as urgent chal-
lenges requiring global attention.9 8 The New York Declaration itself
underscores the seriousness of the problem of xenophobia in face of
large-scale involuntary migration." Both the New York Declaration
and the report of the Secretary-General underscore the importance of
international human rights law and principles for combatting xenopho-
bia. They do less to highlight international refugee law as central to
94. See U.N. Doc. A/70/59, supra note 93, ¶¶ 10-11 ("Large movements often
involve mixed flows of people who move for different reasons and use irregular chan-
nels.").
95. New York Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 3.
96. See id. at Annex I, T 19 ("[W]e will work towards the adoption in 2018 of a
global compact on refugees . . . .").
97. See id. at Annex II, T 9 ("The global compact would be elaborated through a
process of intergovernmental negotiations ... which will begin in early 2017. . . .").
98. U.N. Doc. A/70/59, supra note 93, ¶f 1, 40, 61. This report was produced
pursuant to the General Assembly resolution convening the high-level meeting on large
movements of refugees and migrants. That resolution requested from the United Nations
Secretary-General "a comprehensive report ... setting out recommendations on ways to
address large movements of refugees and migrants. .. " G.A. Res. A/70/49 (H), supra note
92, at 70/539(b).
99. New York Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 14.
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protecting those who meet the refugee definition from xenophobic dis-
crimination.0 0
International refugee law, specifically the United Nations Conven-
tion and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN Refugee Con-
vention and Protocol), should indeed be seen as a cornerstone of the
Framework.'0 International refugee law affords vital protections to
refugees against xenophobic exclusion and discrimination. It prohibits
states from discriminating among refugees on the basis of race, reli-
gion, or country of origin,102 and this prohibition applies irrespective of
whether the refugees are territorially present.0 3 It also obligates
states to ensure the social, economic, and even political integration of
refugees in their host states.10 4 Beyond the substantive provisions of
international refugee law, the international refugee regime has also
birthed one of the global institutional forerunners in terms of elaborat-
ing anti-xenophobia standards: the UN Refugee Agency. The UN Ref-
ugee Agency is arguably the most influential global actor in the admin-
istration of refugee protection, and in 2009 it released the first detailed,
publicly available UN guidance note on combatting xenophobia.05
Along with other bodies such as the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights,10 6 the UN Refugee Agency is a key player in the
Framework and will likely remain so.
100. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/70/59, supra note 93, T 64 (underscoring the importance
of international refugee law obligations to ensure national inclusion of refugees).
101. This is in keeping with the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action
which calls for implementation of international refugee law as a vital part of the global
commitment to combat xenophobia and other forms of intolerance and discrimination.
See Durban Declaration, supra note 39, ¶ 35, at 28 ("State parties should ensure that all
measures relating to refugees must be in full accordance with the 1951 Convention re-
lating to the Status of Refugees and its 1976 Protocol.").
102. Refugee Convention, supra note 70, at art. 3.
103. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 245 (2005) ("While the English language draft of Art. 3 produced by the Second
Session of the Ad Hoc Committee appeared to prohibit only discrimination by a state
"against a refugee within its territory," the French language formulation was not predi-
cated on successful entry into a state's territory."). As James Hathaway notes, states
regularly and flagrantly violate this obligation by implementing programs that discrim-
inate on the basis of race, religion and country of origin. Id. at 239-42 (giving many
examples of the different treatment of refugees in each state).
104. See id. at ch. 6 (analyzing the socio-economic rights of refugees), 977-90 (an-
alyzing naturalization of refugees).
105. See Achiume, supra note 13, at 348-58 (canvassing UNHCR's global influ-
ence and analyzing its 2009 Guidance Note on combatting xenophobia).
106. For example, both OHCHR and the UN Refugee Agency are at the forefront
of newly launched global UN campaigns to combat xenophobia. See, e.g., UNITED
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS
TO PROMOTE INCLUSION ND COUNTER ANTI-MIGRANT NARRATIVES (May 11, 2007),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/IssuesfMigrationi/CounterAntiMi-
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The 2016 report of the Secretary-General identified the priority fo-
cus of global anti-xenophobia intervention as being to shift "the tenor
of policy and public discourse on migrants and refugees [.]"
0 7 Although
the report attributes xenophobic and other anti-migrant discourses
and actions to structural and state-driven factors,'
0 8 it highlights a dif-
ferent approach to addressing the fears and concerns of host communi-
ties: "Given the overwhelming evidence that personal contact signifi-
cantly reduces prejudice, more creative ways of fostering contacts
between host communities on the one hand and refugees and migrants
on the other are urgently needed."09 It is thus no surprise that the
Secretary-General initiated "a global campaign led by the United Na-
tions to counter xenophobia""10 as a fundamental feature of an inter-
national regime capable of addressing large movements of migrants
and refugees."1 In the New York Declaration, UN member states went
on to "commit to combating xenophobia, racism and discrimination,"112
and the means through which they choose to do so are through imple-
mentation of the Secretary-General's United Nations-led global anti-
xenophobia campaign."3 At the center of this campaign, which is cur-
rently in progress, is an emphasis on "direct personal contact between
host communities and refugees and migrants."11
4 UN member states
also pledged to "take a range of steps to counter [xenophobic] attitudes
and behaviour, in particular with regard to hate crimes, hate speech
and racial violence.""15
grant/KeyMessages.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/R5GT-GWUC] (ar-
chived Jan. 21, 2018) (describing some of OHCHR's work in relation to the UN Secretary
General's TOGETHER Campaign).
107. U.N. Doc. A/70/59, supra note 93, T 40.
108. See, e.g., id. ¶ 37 (expressing concern that erection of fences and walls in
response to large movements of refugees and migrants can reinforce xenophobia and un-
dermine global cooperation on migration).
109. Id. ¶ 40.
110. Id. T 61.
111. Id. ("To address [xenophobic narratives and the discrimination they incite] I
have decided to initiate a global campaign led by the United Nations to counter xenopho-
bia.").
112. New York Declaration, supra note 19, T 39.
113. See New York Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 14 ("We welcome the global cam-
paign proposed by the Secretary-General to counter xenophobia and will implement it in
cooperation with the United Nations."). In this regard, UN member states followed the
explicit recommendation of the Secretary-General on xenophobia, calling on UN member
states "[t]o reject political rhetoric that stigmatizes refugees and migrants, pledge to do
everything possible to combat xenophobia and, in particular, to set an example by not
using xenophobic language in their public discourse, and support the Secretary-Gen-
eral's global campaign against xenophobia ..... U.N. Doc. A/70/59, supra note 93, ¶
101(c)(i).





In sum, subparts A and B have articulated the laws, policy, insti-
tutional arrangements, and processes that comprise a discernable if
nascent anti-xenophobia framework. It is most explicitly located in in-
ternational human rights law and principles of equality, nondiscrimi-
nation, and tolerance promotion, with ICERD taking center stage. Ef-
forts within this seam of activity have now initiated drafting of a new
international treaty criminalizing acts of a xenophobic nature. Inter-
national actors have also situated global anti-xenophobia intervention
in processes relating to the global governance of migration and refu-
gees. Within these migration reform processes, UN member states
have highlighted the global anti-xenophobia campaign and other
measures to foster contact among migrants and citizens as the primary
forms of international law to combat xenophobia.
C. The Framework's Priority Commitments: The Prejudice Approach
In the absence of an explicit definition, a review of the Framework
and its constitutive elements reveals an approach to the problem of
xenophobia that treats it primarily as a problem of individuals engag-
ing in apolitical, prejudice-motivated acts against foreigners, especially
involuntary migrants. Put differently, the problem of xenophobia cur-
rently commanding the attention of international actors is that of ex-
plicitly prejudice-based anti-foreigner actions and attitudes of individ-
uals against non-nationals. This is referred to as the prejudice
approach.116 This approach crystalizes and replicates shortcomings
that international and domestic scholars have associated with tradi-
tional or classical liberal rights discourses,11 7 where discrimination or
subordination on the basis of social categories such as race and gender
are concerned. These shortcomings inhere in classical liberalism's ra-
zor-sharp focus on the intentional acts of autonomous individual moral
agents. Too often this occurs at the expense of broader social, economic,
political, and legal structures that can be more salient for legal inter-
vention that seeks to remedy social ills such as racism, sexism, or even
116. Achiume, supra note 13, at 355-61 and accompanying text.
117. I construe liberalism broadly as "the structuring of individual interactions in
society on the basis of a set of rights that require human beings to respect each other's
liberty and equality." JOHN CHARVET AND ELISA KACZYNSKA-NAY, THE LIBERAL PROJECT
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF A NEW WORLD ORDER 3 (2008). A
defining characteristic of liberalism is its quest to limit state coercion to the bare mini-
mum required to uphold its fundamental values: individual liberty and equality. Id at 8.
I distinguish classical or traditional liberal commitments from others in acknowledg-
ment of the arguments some have made for revisionist or new liberalism, which seeks to
overcome some of the longstanding criticisms of classical liberalism's blind spots. For a
brief discussion of the divide between classical and new or revisionist liberalism, see id.
at 5-7.
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xenophobia.1 1 8 In this vein, the prejudice approach to the problem of
xenophobia effectively reduces it primarily to a problem of individuals
harboring xenophobic prejudice, and the approach consequently recom-
mends international engagement or cooperation that combats xeno-
phobic prejudice and its manifestations at the level of individuals.11
9
The recent Human Rights Council resolution calling for criminali-
zation of acts of a xenophobic nature instantiates the ascendance of the
prejudice approach in the elaboration of global anti-xenophobia norms.
By definition, criminal law parses the respective social problem at the
level of the individual as an autonomous agent and insists on individ-
ual culpability and reprimand as the remedial intervention. This ap-
proach to xenophobia would formalize an approach that UN agencies
and even international human rights non-governmental organizations
have consistently advanced as essential in the fight against xenopho-
bia.120 Criminalization has also been a preferred approach at the re-
gional level, at least within the European Union, which has arguably
done more than any other group of states explicitly to coordinate action
against xenophobia.121
118. See, e.g., A. Belden Fields and Wolf-Dieter Narr, Human Rights as a Holistic
Concept, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 4 (1992) ("The theory of a contractual arrangement between
equals, which functions as the ideological basis of law in the modern industrialized
states, ignores the fact that, while people and countries are formally considered to be
equals, their interactions begin from very different positions. Thus, a persistent struc-
ture of inequality in the 'world order' is maintained, modified only in its details."); see
also Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimina-
tion Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 30 (KimberlM Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995)
("The perpetrator perspective [which is in the classical liberal mold] presupposes a world
composed of atomistic individuals whose actions are outside of and apart from the social
fabric and without historical continuity. From this perspective, the law views racial dis-
crimination not as a social phenomenon but merely as the misguided conduct of particu-
lar actors."). For a critique of international human rights liberalism that examines "the
atomized, insular liberal subject on which the human rights project is based," as well the
fate of those constructed as outside of this paradigm (the "Other"), which can include
international migrants, see Ratna Kapur, Take a Walk on the Dark Side, 28 SYDNEY L.
REV. 665, 666 (2006).
119. For a more detailed analysis of the prejudice approach generally, see Achi-
ume, supra note 13, at 355-61.
120. Examples include various initiatives by the UN Refugee Agency and organi-
zations such as Human Rights First's 10 Point Plan of Action for Combatting Hate
Crimes.
121. In its submissions to the UN Human Rights Council's Ad Hoc Committee on
Complementary Standards, as evidence of its implementation of global anti-xenophobia
norms, the EU provided the example of Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on
Combatting Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of
Criminal Law. See Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA, 2008 O.J. (L 328) 55
(laying out the measures EU member states must take with regards to xenophobia).
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Even outside of the criminal law frame, global discussion of best
practices or strategies for combatting the problem of xenophobia have
nonetheless focused on individuals and their prejudice. For example,
in the reports of UN member states on the strategies they have in place
to combat xenophobia, these states point also to civil and administra-
tive measures similarly focusing on individual perpetrators of xeno-
phobic discrimination. These include constitutional law provisions
guaranteeing an individual right to equality and prohibiting discrimi-
nation and criminal and civil law provisions targeting prejudice-moti-
vated offenses.122
If these traditional antidiscrimination legal measures-especially
criminalization-are one dimension of the prejudice approach, the
other is embodied in the global anti-xenophobia campaign launched by
the UN Secretary-General and endorsed by UN member states in the
New York Declaration. As mentioned above, according to the New York
Declaration, the campaign will emphasize, among other things, "direct
personal contact between host communities and refugees and migrants
and will highlight the positive contributions made by the latter, as well
as our common humanity."23 The New York Declaration is part of a
much larger trend-UN agencies and even UN member states have
regularly pursued measures in the human rights education/public ed-
ucation/awareness-raising category with the aim of diminishing xeno-
phobic prejudice.124 Then and now these tolerance promotion measures
engage at the level of individuals and their interpersonal relations,
122. For example, Denmark references its Constitution Act which "guarantees
'full enjoyment of civil and political rights' to all persons," and Turkey cited Article 10 of
the Turkish Constitution, which "prohibits discrimination [using language permitting
wide judicial interpretation,] and provides for 'special measures' to protect particularly
disadvantaged groups." Mutuma Ruteere, Combating Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia nd Related Intolerance and the Comprehensive Implementation of and Fol-
low-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/71/301 (2016).
123. G.A. Res. 71/237, [ 25, International Migration and Development (Dec. 21,
2016).
124. For a discussion of examples of these measures, see Achiume, supra note 13,
at 358-59. This trend continues to be manifest in ongoing negotiations for the Global
Compact on migration, which has focused on the need to dispel inaccurate narratives
about migrants as central to fighting xenophobia. See, e.g., United Nations Fourth Infor-
mal Interactive Multi-Stakeholder Hearing, Preparatory Process for the Global Compact
For Safe, Orderly And Regular Migration And The Intergovernmental Conference On
International Migration, Feb. 21, 2018, http://www.un.org/webcast/pdfs/180221-migra-
tion.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QJ4-E4FA] (archived Mar. 7, 2018) (convening multiple
stakeholders to discuss strategies for changing migrant narratives).
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much in the manner of criminalization and the other individual perpe-
trator-oriented legal interventions described above.125
Notably, although the New York Declaration lays out a vision for
reform of the global governance migration and refugees through the
Global Compacts, which this Article addresses in Part III, that Decla-
ration does not do enough to treat the problem of xenophobia as endog-
enous to the global governance structures. The relegation of global gov-
ernance of migration and refugees, as well as of the international law
and policy structuring this governance to the margins of the Frame-
work, occurs alongside prioritization of a prejudice approach to xeno-
phobia. To be clear, punishing individual perpetrators of xenophobic
acts and taking measures to promote tolerance or counteract xenopho-
bic attitudes have a critical role to play in the global fight against xen-
ophobia. However, to have a prejudice approach as the bedrock of in-
ternational cooperation to address xenophobia is folly, given how
deeply implicated international law and the exercise of nation-state
sovereignty are in the problem of xenophobia. Policing prejudice among
individuals does not account for these other two important factors.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW'S XENOPHOBIC ANXIETY RATCHETS
The global governance of involuntary migration, including through
refugee law, is not incidental to the problem of xenophobia. This Part
argues that, in fact, it is far more central than the prejudice approach
implies. How refugees and migrants are admitted and included factors
into levels of xenophobic and other resistance to these migrants. This
Part provides an account of how shortcomings in the global governance
of involuntary migration can function as "xenophobic anxiety ratchets,"
compounding rather than alleviating the problem.126 In this respect,
this Article contributes to renewed scholarship examining how fea-
tures of the international regulation of migration themselves contrib-
125. In a provision that breaks with the nonetheless dominant orientation to-
wards punishing perpetrators and promoting tolerance, the New York Declaration com-
mits states to pursuing policies to achieve social integration of refugees and migrants as
a means of combatting xenophobic discrimination. Developing the Framework along
these lines is vital. See Achiume, supra note 13 (arguing the need for a shift of this kind).
126. In technical usage, a ratchet is a specific mechanical device that permits
movement in one direction only. Rachet, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.ox-
forddictionaries.com/definition/ratchet [https://perma.cc/MF3U-H3E4] (archived Jan.
22, 2018). As a verb, to ratchet something up or down, means to cause it to rise or fall in
a process that is not easy to reverse. Id. I describe features of the global involuntary
migration governance regimes as "xenophobic anxiety ratchets" to draw attention to how
these features escalate this anxiety, which is then very difficult to diffuse.
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ute to disastrous migration outcomes and even construct the percep-
tion and reality of crisis currently associated with mass involuntary
movement.127 To be clear, the Article seeks not to prove conclusively
that international law and policy exacerbate xenophobic anxiety but
rather to posit a compelling, empirically attuned account of the rela-
tionship between international law and this phenomenon.128
A. Xenophobic Anxiety as Political Anxiety
As mentioned in the Introduction, where the problem of xenopho-
bia implicates migration across international borders, a characteristic
objective associated with it is political. It entails exclusion from the
nation-state and the benefits traditionally associated with such mem-
bership.'2 9 Such a conception of xenophobia must be a crucial starting
point for global intervention targeting this problem. A rich, empirically
grounded interdisciplinary literature exists theorizing xenophobic ex-
clusion and its legitimating discourses as rooted in concerns about the
127. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that the architecture of interna-
tional migration law [is] a driver of migration crises); Ralph Wilde, 'Let them Drown'-
Rescuing Migrants at Sea and the Non-Refoulement Obligation as a Case Study of Inter-
national Law's Relationship to 'Crisis,' EJIL: TALK! (Feb. 25, 2017),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/et-them-drown-rescuing-migrants-at-sea-and-the-non-re-
foulement-obligation-as-a-case-study-of-international-laws-relationship-to-crisis-part-i/
[https://perma.cclU44M-SDDF] (archived Jan. 22, 2018) (discussing international law as
part of the problem and solution where migrants in peril at sea are concerned).
128. My point is there is good reason to believe that features of the governance
framework-along with many other complex factors-help fuel xenophobic anxiety.
These features seem causally related to xenophobic anxiety even though, of course, the
factors that lead nations or groups of nationals to push for the exclusion of foreigners
include so much more than problems with the international law and policy of involuntary
migration.
129. To reiterate, I use the term "political" to signify concerns about the national
collective-its constitution, beneficiaries and boundaries-as distinct from individual or
group concerns that are of a predominantly personal nature. For example, a parent may
oppose social interaction with foreigners because she does not wish any of her children
to marry a foreigner and risk altering the fiercely guarded ethnic (or racial) purity of her
family. This is an example of a personal anxiety for the purposes of my current analysis.
On the other hand, a parent may oppose social interactions with foreigners because she
fears intermarriage undermines the purity of the nation. Although the latter clearly im-
plicates personal considerations, concern for the national collective is also significantly
non-instrumental-the wellbeing of the nation is independently meaningful. The bound-
ary between the personal or private and the political, is of course, very fraught and I do
not mean to belie this fraughtness in my analysis. A long tradition of scholars have fruit-
fully challenged the personal/political divide, and even while these challenges are com-
pelling, there is residual value in distinguishing anxieties that are especially attuned to
the boundaries and benefits of national political community from those that seem more
concerned with other ways of affiliating. As I will argue later, the difference between an
apolitical and a political conception of xenophobia has serious ramifications for compre-
hension of the nature of law's relationship with the problem of xenophobia.
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nation-state.13 0 The concept of xenophobic anxiety, which this Article
uses as shorthand for the concerns (anxieties) that polity insiders mo-
bilize in discourse and action in order to motivate, justify, or legitimate
racialized or otherwise normatively suspect exclusion of foreigners,
aids analysis here.131 Put differently, xenophobic anxiety refers to the
legitimating or motivating discourses that at a minimum make xeno-
phobic exclusion more socially, politically, and legally acceptable, and
thus arguably more likely. 3
2
Xenophobic anxiety is a property attributable to individuals acting
in their private capacity, as when a mob burns down a refugee hostel
motivated by animosity toward that group, and to individuals acting in
their official state capacity, as when a mayor pledges to deny municipal
services to refugees of a specific religion. It is also a property attribut-
able to political bodies or entities such as nation-states that enact pol-
icies prohibiting the territorial admission of refugees of specific na-
tional origin. In all three cases, xenophobic anxiety refers to the
articulated discourses of concerns that either motivate xenophobic
130. For a comprehensive review of the dominant approaches in sociology and an-
thropology as they relate to xenophobic exclusion in the industrialized world, see An-
dreus Wimmer, Explaining Xenophobia and Racism: A Critical Review of Current Re-
search Approaches, 20(1) ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 14 (1997); see also ANDREUS
WIMMER, NATIONALIST EXCLUSION AND ETHNIC CONFLICT: SHADOWS OF MODERNITY
(CAMBRIDGE 2002). This review does not include social psychological theories or Marxist
explanatory approaches, but is instead confined to "explanations of contemporary racism
and xenophobia in late industrial societies." Id. at 201. For an example from the global
south, see EXORCISING THE DEMONS WITHIN: XENOPHOBIA, VIOLENCE, AND STATECRAFT
IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH AFRICA 3 (Loren B. Landau ed., 2012).
131. The term "xenophobic anxiety" is partially inspired by references by various
commentators to an "anxious middle"-a majority of a given polity, resistant to immi-
gration largely due to skepticism that immigration is beneficial to the polity. See, e.g.,
Sunder Katwala & Will Somerville, Engaging the Anxious Middle on Immigration Re-
form: Evidence from the UKDebate, MIGRATION POL'YINST. (May 2016), https://www.mi-
grationpolicy.org/researchlengaging-anxious-middle-immigration-reform-evidence-uk-
debate [https://perma.cclLQ8U-WPM9] (archived Jan. 22, 2018) (describing the "anxious
middle" as individuals "who are skeptical about the government's handling of immigra-
tion and worried about the effects of immigration on society and the economy"). Other
legal scholars have used the terminology of anxieties to refer to concerns about migra-
tion. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship,
Law in the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 525, 526 (2000) (referring to "cultural anxieties" as a cause of the restrictionist
sentiments among Americans towards immigration in the 1990s).
132. The idea that legitimating discourses have a role in bringing about or exac-
erbating xenophobic exclusion finds support in the work of discourse theories of xeno-
phobia in sociology and anthropology. See Wimmer, Explaining Xenophobia, supra note
130, at 25 (reviewing, among others, discourse theories of xenophobia); see also Jens
Rydgren, Meso-Level Reasons for Racism and Xenophobia: Some Converging and Diverg-
ing Effects of Radical Right Populism in France and Sweden, 6(1) EUR. J. OF SOC.
THEORY, 45, 46 (2003) (arguing the role of political articulation-specifically the rise of
anti-immigrant right-wing parties-in increasing xenophobic attitudes).
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harm or are deployed to justify and legitimate it. Xenophobic anxiety
at the level of the state-expressed in law, policy, and practice-may
be intimately tied to xenophobic anxiety held by private individuals. In
some cases, state-level anxiety is cumulative or representative in that
either through formal votes or some other politically legible signalling,
the xenophobic anxieties of a majority (or a politically powerful minor-
ity) are able to find expression where they might otherwise have not.
In other cases, it may be that state-level anxiety is the product of un-
accountable political actors whose private xenophobic anxieties under-
handedly acquire the backing of state machinery.
The point here is that although prejudice among individuals may
be a constituent of xenophobic anxiety, the organizing principle of this
anxiety is arguably considerations about the national collective, its en-
titlements, and its members. And in fact, among the "xenophobically
anxious," a predicate for claims of foreigner exclusion, is a deep-seated
belief that territorial or other exclusion is a legitimate entitlement of
state sovereignty. Polity insiders perceive a loss of control over the ter-
ritory and benefits of their polity, and today involuntary migrants-
including refugees-have become an especially potent icon for this de-
cline.133 In this sense, xenophobic anxiety is responsive to actual and
perceived shifts in the distribution of state sovereignty, and is in some
respects a backlash that seeks to reconsolidate sovereignty in the
state.134 International law and the nation-states that author it stand
at the center of global migration and refugee governance and through
this governance determine the extent and terms of sovereign states'
right to exclude non-nationals as well as popular perceptions of this
dimension of state sovereignty. Thus in principle, at the very least, the
global governance of migration and refugees itself may impact xeno-
phobic anxiety, even making it worse if the nature of this global gov-
ernance creates or amplifies conditions correlated with national re-
sistance to migrant admission and inclusion.
One might reasonably ask what class of anti-migrant anxiety
meets the threshold of xenophobic anxiety. As discussed in Part I, there
is no definition of xenophobia in international law. The lack of discern-
able consensus on the bounds of the term makes it impossible to pro-
vide a pithy definition of exactly what kind of anti-migrant anxiety
qualifies as xenophobic under the prevailing international normative
133. WENDY BROWN, WALLED STATES, WANING SOVEREIGNTY 68-69 (2010) ("Al-
most nothing rivals the image of immigrant hordes as incitement to xenophobic nation-
alism and to demands for fierce state protectionism amid globalization.").
134. Wendy Brown has theorized the global pandemic of construction of border
walls as soothing "the psychic-political desires, anxieties, and needs of late modern sub-
jects," triggered by waning sovereignty. Id. at 107.
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standards. What is at stake in identifying anti-migrant anxieties as
xenophobic has largely to do with the normative work performed by the
term xenophobia and its cognates. Designating anxieties about the ar-
rival or incorporation of involuntary migrants as "xenophobic" marks
them as normatively out of bounds.'3 5 There are conceivably as many
variations on the standard that should determine when anti-foreigner
conduct or attitudes appropriately bear the designation "xenophobic"
as there are normative positions on the duties owed to foreign nation-
als and the ethics of political membership.13 6 Making an argument for
what should qualify as xenophobic anxiety is an important task, but it
exceeds the scope of this Article.
For the purposes of the argument here it is sufficient to offer a
rough sketch of the type of anti-migrant anxiety that is a strong candi-
date for the designation "xenophobic," without any pretension of
providing an exhaustive account.137 At a minimum, anti-migrant anx-
iety that is explicitly rooted in racial prejudice easily warrants the
"xenophobic" designation, where "racial" has the broad meaning codi-
fied in Article 1.1 of ICERD. In other words, anti-migrant anxiety that
intentionally seeks to exclude non-nationals because of prejudice on
the basis of race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin must count
as xenophobic anxiety. In addition to anti-migrant anxiety that is ex-
plicitly rooted in racial prejudice so defined, anti-migrant anxiety that
135. Here, the work of legal scholars of immigration in the United States is useful
even though much of this work focuses on "nativism," a concept that is closely related to
xenophobia. The most salient genealogy of the term "nativism" in U.S. immigration
scholarship ties it to John Higham who defines it as "intense opposition to an internal
minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e., 'un-American') connections." JOHN HIGHAM,
STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIvISM 1860-1925 4 (1970). Linda
Bosniak writes that notwithstanding deep social and political contestation regarding
what discourses appropriately deserve the descriptor "nativist," there is no question
about what the descriptor does: "To call discourse or policy 'nativist' represents an effort
to disable it through social opprobrium." Linda Bosniak, "Nativism" the Concept, in
IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED
STATES 284 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997).
136. Questions regarding the appropriate norms of inclusion and exclusion of non-
nationals have long occupied political and legal theorists alike, and they continue to do
so today. Some examples include LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN:
DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP (2006); JOSEPH H. CARENS, THE ETHICS OF
IMMIGRATION (2013); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAw (2014);
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
137. One need not agree fully with the working definition offered here of the class
of anti-migrant anxiety that appropriately bears the label "xenophobic" in order to be
persuaded by the central arguments of this Article. This Part proposes the means
through which governance features exacerbate a broad swath of anti-migrant anxiety.
Disagreement over what subset of that anti-migrant anxiety is xenophobic does not un-
dermine the argument that governance features have an impact on the general universal
set of political anxiety that is anti-migrant.
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achieves racialized exclusion of foreigners should qualify as xenopho-
bic. In other words, anti-migrant anxiety that de facto results in exclu-
sion largely of non-nationals of a particular race, color, descent, or na-
tional or ethnic origin should also bear the designation of xenophobic,
in so far as the designation aims to signal the normative acceptability
of discourses or policies that distribute suffering or harm among non-
nationals on a racial basis.138
The aim of the remainder of this Part is to provide some recent
examples that provide empirical support for the claim that certain fea-
tures of the global governance of migration and refugees seem to in-
crease resistance to admission and inclusion of non-nationals, and in
so doing function as xenophobic anxiety ratchets. Crucially, they do so
in a manner for which a prejudice approach alone cannot account. In
mounting this critique, this Article's aim is not to undercut the present
value of both the global refugee and international human rights re-
gimes for mitigating the inhumane treatment of involuntary migrants.
It is instead to provide important information about the costs one
should also rightfully associate with the existing structure and content
of the international law applicable to involuntary migration, and the
governance regime of which it is a part.
These examples largely draw on dynamics that have occurred this
decade. The intensity and scale of recent involuntary displacement
across international borders are noteworthy, and the epicenter, at the
time of writing of this Article, is the Syrian refugee crisis, which has
been the biggest front of conflict driven displacement since the Second
World War.1 39 A focus on this situation is worthwhile because the scale
and nature of this recent movement magnify the weaknesses of global
138. Condemnation of anti-migrant anxiety that has the effect of exclusion on the
basis of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin is consistent with ICERD's
general approach to racial discrimination. Prohibited racial discrimination can occur in
the absence of explicit animus, and can be based instead on disproportionate impact.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec.
21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, Art. 1.1 (Jan. 4, 1969); Achiume, supra note 13, at 361-68
(arguing that important commitment of ICERD is "ensuring that vulnerable social
groups, such as racial, ethnic, and other minority groups, do not become social under-
classes, such that members of these groups are systemically denied human rights . . .");
see also WOUTER VANDENHOLE, NON-DISCRIMINATION AND EQUALITY IN THE VIEW OF
THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES 84-85 (2005) (analyzing the prohibition on indi-
rect discrimination under various international human rights treaties).
139. For an overview of the events leading up to the Syrian conflict and an over-
view of the Syrian refugee crisis, see E. Tendayi Achiume, Syria, Cost-Sharing, and the
Responsibility to Protect Refugees, 100 MINN. L. REV. 687, 695 (2015). The NATO-led in-
tervention into Libya in 2011 is also an important part of this picture. See E. Tendayi
Achiume, Focus on Europe Neglects the Syrian Refugee Crisis, JURIST (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://www.jurist.org/forum/2015/1 1/Tendayi-Achiume-Syrian-Refugees.php.
[https://perma.cc/6LTJ-HV2B] (archived Jan. 20, 2018).
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governance of involuntary migration and mark a notable phase of a
much longer history of crisis in involuntary migration.
140
B. Gaps in International Refugee Law: Refugee Regional Containment
and Absence of a Sustainable and Equitable International Cost-
Sharing Mechanism
The first claim is that the underfunded, regional containment of
refugees achieved largely in formal compliance with international ref-
ugee law seemingly exacerbates xenophobic anxiety, xenophobic harm,
and anti-refugee policies. To motivate this claim, some background on
the Syrian refugee crisis is useful.
At the end of 2016, there were close to five million Syrian refugees,
overwhelmingly concentrated in Syria's vicinity in Turkey, Lebanon,
Jordan, and Iraq. Over 80 percent of Syrian refugees in the Middle
East were outside of camps, living among host populations, with very
limited host state or international support.
141 Few of these refugees
were authorized by their host states to work. This meant that refugee
livelihood was contingent on finding informal work-typically at ex-
ploitative wages-or on engaging in dangerous survival practices. The
arrival of refugees in such large numbers also severely impacted the
livelihood of regional host communities. In parts of these regional host
countries, the scale of Syrian displacement significantly depressed
wages and inflated accommodation rentals, increasing the vulnerabil-
ity of working class populations and others living close to or in poverty.
The humanitarian circumstances facing refugees and host commu-
nities in the Middle East are a partial product of the global refugee
protection regime. This regime entrenches an inequitable and unsus-
tainable distribution of the cost and responsibility of aiding refugees
and their hosts.14 2 International refugee law requires states bound by
it to protect refugees within their jurisdiction.1
4 3 However, it imposes
no corresponding legally binding obligation on states to assist third
states unable to sustain refugees under the latter's jurisdiction. The
cost of this legal arrangement is borne disproportionately by countries
close to conflict, even when countries more geographically remote from
140. See Jacqueline Bhabha, Human Mobility and the Longue Durde: The Prehis-
tory of Global Migration Law, 111 AM. J. OF INT'L. L. 136, 136-37 (2017) (placing the
substantial scale of involuntary migration today within a much longer history of crisis
in involuntary human migration).
141. For an overview of the international response to the Syrian refugee crisis
and an international regime within which further international cooperation to address
the crisis might be achieved, see Achiume, Syria, Cost-Sharing, supra note 139, at 699.
142. Id. at 703.
143. Refugee Convention, supra note 70, at art. 33(1) (non-refoulement principle).
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conflict share the blame in causing the displacement in the first
place.'44 The Syrian refugee crisis illustrates this point, which others
have identified at play elsewhere.145 Although there are international
law principles that provide a basis for more robust international coop-
eration to share the cost and responsibility of refugee protection, no
widely accepted binding international law requires third states to pro-
vide assistance to any country hosting Syrian refugees.146
The resources necessary for regional host countries to sustain their
support of Syrian refugees are significant and far beyond the means of
these states. Consider the stark example of Lebanon. In 2016, that
country hosted a refugee population whose proportion of its national
population (about 25 percent) is unthinkable for most states around
the world, especially those in the First World. It did so with far fewer
resources than those available to many of the countries that played a
leading role in Syria's implosion and that remain resistant to accom-
modating Syrian refugees. At the same time, countries geographically
remote from Syria-including those complicit in the conflict-share
fully in the benefits that accrue from regional assistance of Syrian ref-
ugees.14 7 Despite repeated appeals by regional host governments and
international aid and protection agencies, international assistance to
the regional protection of refugees has been abysmally low.148 Under
144. See E. Tendayi Achiume, The Fact of Xenophobia and the Fiction of State
Sovereignty: A Reply to Blocher and Gulati, COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. ONLINE 15,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2907193 https://perma.cc/GC5J-
S7Q5 (archived Feb. 14, 2018) (discussing how powerful countries and especially coun-
tries in the global north can avoid responsibility concerning the displacement of refugees
at the expense of weaker states, often times from the global south).
145. Deborah Anker et al., Crisis and Cure: A Reply to Hathaway/Neve and
Schuck, 11 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 295, 297-98 (1998); B.S. Chimni, The Law and Politics
of Regional Solution of the Refugee Problem: The Case Of South Asia, RCSS POL. STUD.
4 (1998); James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law
Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 115, 121-30 (1997).
146. Achiume, Syria, Cost-Sharing, supra note 139, at 690; T. Alexander Aleini-
koff, Rethinking the International Refugee Regime, YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE 4-5,
http://www.yjil.yale.edulfiles/2016/09/41-spring-aleinikoff-rethinking-international-ref-
ugee-regime- 1-28plgw9.pdf. [https://perma.cc/6FS5-VV68] (archived Jan. 21, 2018).
147. See, e.g., Alexander Betts, International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime
in REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 58 (Alexander Betts & Gil Loescher eds.,
2010) (arguing that refugee protection has features of a public good).
148. As of September 2016 the regional refugee response effort was only forty per-
cent funded. UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, Inter-Agency Sharing Portal,
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php [https://perma.cc/4C63-RSCA] (ar-
chived Jan. 22, 2018) ("Many refugees are unable to go home because of continued con-
flict, war, and persecution. They also may have sought protection in countries where
their specific needs cannot be met. In these circumstances, UNHCR helps to resettle
refugees in a third country, transferring them from an asylum country to another State
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the global refugee regime, the primary formal means through which
refugee populations are geographically redistributed is resettle-
ment.149 Resettlement is voluntary-it involves third states agreeing
largely on their own terms to admit refugees from other countries that
have granted these refugees status.150 Many states outside the region
have remained reluctant to resettle refugees currently in Syria's vicin-
ity to locations elsewhere as a means of alleviating the challenges re-
sulting from regional containment. President Trump's January Execu-
tive Order suspending Syrian refugee resettlement in the United
States offers a vivid example.
The dynamic of grossly asymmetrical refugee distribution and sup-
port just described in relation to the Syrian crisis is largely representa-
tive of the global picture. In 2015, 1.8 million refugees were newly dis-
placed.151 In that same year, industrialized countries such as the
United States (66,500 resettled refugees), Canada (20,000 resettled
refugees), and Australia (9,400 resettled refugees) resettled the largest
numbers of refugees, but this belies the minimal nature of the overall
contribution this makes. The total number of refugee resettlements,
including by these three countries, amounted to a paltry 6 percent of
1.8 million newly displaced,152 again notwithstanding the active in-
volvement of wealthy global hegemons in producing the displacement
at hand.1 53 This reality contributes to the regional concentration of ref-
ugees in the Third World, where more than 80 percent of the global
refugee population has consistently been concentrated for more than
two decades.154 This state of affairs is in full formal compliance with
the international legal regime in place. As a result, insofar as interna-
tional law shapes the behavior of states and other international ac-
tors,15 5 it currently contributes a distorted and dangerous distribution
that has agreed to admit them as refugees and ultimately grant them permanent resi-
dence.").
149. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, at 25 (June 20,
2016), http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf [https://perma.cc/94V5-CD6A] (archived
Jan. 22, 2018).
150. In many countries, including those that have not ratified the UN Refugee
Convention and its Protocol, it is the UN Refugee Agency that determines and grants
refugee status in place of the refugee-hosting state.
151. UTNHCR, supra note 149, at 6.
152. In 2015, states accepted only 107,100 refugees for resettlement. Id. at 8.
153. Fifty-four percent of the global refugee population comes from Syria, Afghan-
istan and Somalia-all countries whose conflicts have been internationalized by the in-
volvement of foreign states. Achiume, supra note 144, at 3, 13.
154. UNHCR, supra note 149, at 14.
155. For an overview of rational actor models and constructivist models regarding
how international law shapes state behavior, see Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L. J. 1935, 1944-62 (2002). The underlying pre-
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of the responsibility of protecting and assisting refugees, with dire con-
sequences for many. Countries in the Third World that are close to con-
flict and, which due to lack of state capacity, cannot achieve the same
levels of refugee exclusion as countries in the West, shoulder the brunt
of refugee protection. And countries in the West, which are both effec-
tive at and committed to refugee exclusion, have no formal legal obli-
gations to assist.
This dysfunctional distribution of responsibility and cost, which is
structured by international law, implicates the problem of xenophobia.
This has arguably been the case in the context of the Syrian refugee
crisis: the regional containment of refugees in the absence of robust
international assistance to regional hosts and refugees has seemingly
exacerbated xenophobic anxiety.
Early in the crisis the national populations of Jordan, Turkey, Leb-
anon, and Iraq opened their borders, neighborhoods, and homes to Syr-
ian refugees-reports of xenophobic harm by private actors targeting
Syrians or of sweeping national policies for Syrian refugee exclusion
were relatively infrequent. As the numbers of Syrians seeking refuge
in neighboring countries escalated, anti-foreigner attitudes, policies,
and practices increased, heightening the vulnerability of Syrian refu-
gees in the region. Turkey, which hosted close to three million Syrian
refugees at the end of 2016, the vast majority outside camps, provides
one example.156 With the largest refugee population in the world, some
towns in Turkey had more Syrian refugees than Turkish residents.57
The steady rise in the refugee population as the Syrian conflict contin-
ued brought with it increasing anti-refugee tension, some of it xeno-
phobic.1 58 Media reports documented "extreme right wing groups . . .
sumption of the present Article is that rational actor and norm-based mechanisms rein-
force each other "through a dynamic relationship," Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How
To Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L. J.
621, 627 (2004), such that regime design should incorporate elements of both. For a fuller
discussion of the influence of international legal regimes in the refugee responsibility
sharing context, see Achiume, Syria, Cost-Sharing, supra note 139, at 702-05.
156. As of September 2016, Turkey hosts the largest population of refugees glob-
ally. The vast majority of these refugees reside outside camps. M. MURAT ERDOGAN,
SYRIANS-BAROMETER-2017 31 (2017), https://mmuraterdogan.files.wordpress.com/2016/
06/syrians-barometer-executive-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/754J-XUCE] (archived
Feb. 14, 2018).
157. Kilis, a Turkish town of approximately 90,000 hosted 130,000 Syrian refu-
gees in late 2016. Id.
158. In 2014 the Turkish government announced it was going to take measures
against growing xenophobia against refugees. Xenophobia Against Syrian Refugees on
Rise: Turkish Government, HURRIYET DAILY NEws (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.hurriyet-
dailynews.com/xenophobia-against-syrian-refugees-on-rise-turkish-government-
.aspx?PagelD=238&NID=70857&NewsCatlD=341 [https://perma.cc/X3RW-EHTW] (ar-
chived Jan. 22, 2018).
2018]J 377
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
hunting down Syrian refugees to verbally and physically attack
them [.]'159 In one incident in the province of Sanliurfa, an alleged knife
attack and phone theft by a Syrian refugee led to protests against the
presence of Syrian refugees, followed a week later by stoning of Syrian
shops and attempts to lynch Syrians.1 60 Two studies on Turkish social
attitudes towards Syrian refugees reported anti-refugee discourses,
some of them xenophobic.161 One concluded that dissipating xenopho-
bic anxiety was contingent on improvement in the government's man-
agement of migration and renewed support from Turkish society.162
In addition to these private xenophobic attitudes and violence, Syr-
ian refugees have also increasingly been subjected to anti-refugee state
policies in neighboring countries as the Syrian conflict has extended.
Lebanon again offers an example. Lebanon initially maintained a
largely open border with Syria, allowing Syrian refugees to flee the
conflict and seek refuge in its territory. However, as the conflict con-
tinued, Lebanon imposed significant border restrictions for Syrians (on
occasion, it has even closed its border entirely), effectively preventing
the escape from Syria of many would-be refugees. Such policy is unde-
niably harmful to Syrian refugees and ultimately fatal given conditions
in Syria, even if Lebanon has justified this course of action on the basis
of plausible economic and political concerns.163 Resource constraints
159. Dogus Simsek, Anti-Syrian Racism in Turkey, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Jan. 27
2015), https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/dogus-simseklantisyrian-rac-
ism-in-turkey [https://perma.cc/RJX5-VDSR] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
160. Menekse Tokyay, Is Xenophobia Against Syrian Refugees on the Rise in Tur-
key?, AL ARABIA ENGLISH (Aug. 1, 2016), https://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspec-
tivelanalysis/2016/08/01/Is-xenophobia-against-Syrian-refugees-on-the-rise-in-Turkey-
.html [https://perma.cclV7KY-S4R9] (archived Aug. 1, 2016).
161. M. Murat Erdogan, Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration,
HACETEPE UNIVERSITY MIGRATION AND POLITICS RESEARCH CENTER 4 (2014); Senay
Ozden, Syrian Refugees in Turkey, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, MIGRATION
POLICY CENTER 10-11 (2013); See also Simsek, supra note 159 (describing negative atti-
tudes among Turks towards Syrian refugees).
162. M. Murat Erdogan, Perceptions of Syrians in Turkey, 16 INSIGHT TURKEY 65,
66 (2014).
163. Achiume, Syria, Cost-Sharing, supra note 139, at 724; Nicholas Blanford, Is
Lebanon Closing its Door to Syrian Refugees?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Jan. 5,
2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/201 5/0105/Is-Lebanon-closing-its-
door-to-Syrian-refugees-video [https://perma.cc/4534-H66N] (archived Jan. 21, 2018);
Lebanon Sharply Limits Syrian Refugee Entry, AL ARABIYA ENGLISH (Oct. 18, 2014),
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/10/18/Lebanon-sharply-limits-
Syrian-refugee-entry-.html [https://perma.cc/9M4E-E9U7] (archived Jan. 21, 2018). As
mentioned previously, about a quarter of Lebanon's population is now Syrian refugees,
and socio-economic conditions for refugees and Lebanese alike have dramatically deteri-
orated as a result of the refugee crisis. Zeinab Cherri, Pedro Arcos Gonzalez & Rafael
Castro Delgado, The Lebanese-Syrian Crisis: Impact of Influx of Syrian Refugees to an
Already Weak State, 9 RISK MGMT. AND HEALTHCARE POL'Y 165, 165-71 (2016) (consoli-
dating assessments of the demographic, economic, social services, political and security
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presided over by international law contributed to state backlash
against refugee inclusion, just as these constraints seemingly fueled
private xenophobia against refugees.
In sum, to recapitulate the overall claim in this subpart: the re-
gional containment of large numbers of refugees, compounded by lim-
ited international assistance to regional hosts, seemingly exacerbates
xenophobic anxiety. International law is among the variables at the
center of the problem. Although international refugee law has features
that qualify it as an anti-xenophobia apparatus, insofar as it structures
both the regional containment of refugees and the absence of robust
international cooperation, these shortcomings function as a xenophobic
anxiety ratchet built into the international legal regime.
C. Gaps in International Refugee Law and in the "International Law
of Migration"- Chaotic and Unauthorized Movement
There is reason to believe that chaotic, irregular migration can
make xenophobic anxiety and exclusion worse. This has been the case
in Europe and North America.164 The way that migrants move and the
manner in which they arrive in receiving states can play a significant
role in whether the popular response to these migrants is welcoming
or hostile and even xenophobic. Popular responses to migrants are im-
portant because they can directly impact the daily treatment of terri-
torially present migrants, and they can also shape national policies on
whether these migrants are even admitted in the first place. This can
happen when policymakers-through democratic processes-respond
to popular pressure on how to respond to the arrival or presence of mi-
grants. It can also happen when political and other leaders actively
impacts of the Syrian refugee crisis on Lebanon). With respect to political security con-
cerns, in the wake of the Syrian refugee crisis, Lebanon has experienced the highest
levels of sectarian conflict since its civil war. Lebanon is organized as a consociational
democracy in an attempt to manage deep political divisions along religious lines vi-
sions that persist and result in a polity susceptible to internal conflict. See Samir Makdisi
& Marcus Marktanner, Trapped by Consociationalism: The Case of Lebanon, 11 TOPICS
IN MIDDLE E. AND N. AFR. ECON. 1-5 (2009) (giving an overview of Lebanon's consocia-
tional system). There is a convincing case to be made that rapid destabilization of this
balance poses a serious threat to the Lebanese nation-state. Amal Mudallali, Lebanon's
Existential Threats, 29 VIEWPOINTS 1 (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Schol-
ars June 2013).
164. European and North American backlash against the arrival of Syrian and
other refugees and migrants in 2015-16 was remarkable, and of course attributable to
host of other factors alongside the nature and scale of the movement. My point in this
subsection is simply that the nature and scale of the movement were an important part
of what is admittedly a much larger the explanatory picture.
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exploit popular sentiment in order to advance their previously mar-
ginal xenophobic platforms. Consider the following example.
As the conflict in Syria extended, and as socioeconomic and secu-
rity conditions for refugees in regional host countries deteriorated, Syr-
ian refugees increasingly took longer and more dangerous journeys in
search of refuge. To be clear, Syrian refugees remain mostly concen-
trated in Syria's neighbors. The UN Refugee Agency estimated that by
mid-2016 only a little over 10 percent of Syrians seeking international
protection had done so in Europe.
165 However, most Syrian refugees
reaching Europe did so in the latter half of 2015. In 2014, only 137,798
Syrian refugees in total applied for asylum in Europe, but in 2015
alone, over a million refugees and other involuntary migrants traveled
to Europe by sea, and Syrians constituted the largest nationality group
among. these.166 The arrival of these refugees and other involuntary
migrants on European shores trained Western media and popular at-
tention to the Syrian refugee crisis in a way that the full-blown refugee
crisis in the Middle East previously had failed to achieve.
16 7 Images of
the desperate flight of tens of thousands of involuntary migrants dom-
inated international news cycles, broadcasting the theater of deadly
chaos that characterized flight into and across Europe during this pe-
riod.
With the arrival of refugees and involuntary migrants in Europe
from mid-2015 to early 2016, reports documented the rise of violent
attacks against refugees and migrants both in countries with explicit
policies welcoming these groups and in countries with explicit policies
to exclude them. In Europe, Germany is the country currently hosting
the largest number of Syrian refugees. In the first six months of 2015,
the German Interior Ministry recorded 202 attacks on housing for asy-
lum seekers, "including attempts to render shelters uninhabitable
thr6ugh arson, attacks with stones or other vandalism."
168 In 2014
165. UNHCR, Europe: Syrian Asylum Applications, INTER-AGENCY SHARING
PORTAL, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/asylum.php (last visited Aug. 26, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/GGS2-478D] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
166. Id.; UNHCR, Refugees /Migrants Emergency Response-Mediterranean,
INTER-AGENCY SHARING PORTAL, http://data.unher.org/mediterranean/regional.php
(last visited Aug. 26, 2016) [https://perma.cc/2JB8-72F8] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
167. For my argument for why the migration crisis in Europe must be treated as
ancillary to the refugee crisis in the Middle East, see Achiume, Focus on Europe Neglects
the Syrian Refugee Crisis, supra note 139.
168. Melissa Eddy, Violent Backlash Against Migrants in Germany as Asylum-
Seekers Pour In, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/1
4 /
world/europe/germany-migrants-attacks-asylum-seekers-backlash.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cclRJN6-272N] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
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there were 150 such acts, whereas in 2012 there were only 24.169 Swe-
den hosts the second largest number of Syrian refugees and it, too, ex-
perienced spikes in xenophobic violence and political rhetoric, as did
other European countries.170
Syrian refugees and other involuntary migrants also faced aggres-
sive xenophobic state policies, many of which were directed and but-
tressed by extreme right-wing political rhetoric. Frontier Eastern Eu-
ropean EU countries such as Hungary, Slovenia, and Bulgaria erected
border walls to keep refugees and migrants out, and in some cases did
so in concert with western European nations.171 Unlike regional hosts
in the Middle East, these countries rapidly responded with measures
to bar the arrival of refugees and involuntary migrants seeking asylum
at their borders. At the same time, some of these countries even re-
sisted efforts within the European Union to assist frontier EU coun-
tries such as Greece and Italy that hosted a disproportionate share of
refugees in the region. In 2015, Poland saw the election of the right-
wing Law and Justice Party as the parliamentary majority.172 It was
169. Id.; OECD, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OUTLOOK (Sep. 22, 2015),
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-
outlook-2015migr-outlook-2015-en [https://perma.cc/NP79-PHQV] (archived Jan. 22,
2018).
170. Although the recent arrivals of Syrian refugees and involuntary migrants
may have exacerbated xenophobic contestation, such anti-immigrant virulence preceded
it. Social anthropologist Sindre Bangstad notes, for example, that "Norway has since
October 2013 had the most right-wing government in Norwegian history, a coalition gov-
ernment between the populist right-wing Progress Party and the Conservative Party.
The main mobilizing factor for the Progress Party voters since 1987 has been the party's
policies on immigration and integration-and any balanced assessment of the party's
record on this will tell you that it has long traded on bashing both refugees, immigrants
and minorities-particularly so when these happen to be of Muslim background[.]" Sin-
dre Bangstad, Presentation for Conference on Xenophobia and Social Integration,
INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 2 (2015). For a fuller ac-
count of the history and trajectory of Islamophobia in Norway, see SINDRE BANGSTAD,
ANDERS BREIVIK AND THE RISE OF ISLAMOPHOBIA 33-70 (2014).
171. Christoph Hasselbach, Austria's Rapid Reversal in Refugee Policy, DW (Mar.
3, 2016), http://www.dw.comlenlaustrias-rapid-reversal-in-refugee-policy/a-19092684
[https://perma.cc/3WFE-TN2R] (archived Jan. 22, 2018) (describing Austrian collabora-
tion with eastern EU and Balkan countries to help Macedonia close its border with EU
member Greece).
172. A range of factors explain the rise to power of the right-wing, and among
them was "the fear of migrants and refugees coming from predominantly Muslim coun-
tries[.]" Joanna Fomina & Jacek Kucharczyk, Populism and Protest in Poland, 27(4) J.
OF DEMOCRACY 58, 62 (2016). In the lead up to the polls, the head of the Law and Justice
Party proclaimed that migrants had already brought diseases to Europe, and would fur-
ther bring "all sorts of parasites and protozoa, which ... while not dangerous in the
organisms of [the migrants], could be dangerous here [Poland]." Remi Adekoya, A Law
and Justice Victory in Poland Could be Good News for Putin (Oct. 24, 2015), THE
GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/24/law-and-justice-po-
land-putin-russia [https://perma.cc/7JXF-T5BL] (archived Jan. 21, 2018) ("[T]he Law
20181 381
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
also a year in which "thousands of Poles took to the streets and social
media to promote participation in anti-refugee marches across the
country, organized by far-right nationalist movements[]"17 3 as large
numbers of Syrian refugees sought asylum in Europe. Initially, Poland
agreed to resettle Christian Syrian refugees but refused to accept Mus-
lim refugees citing national security concerns it associated with Mus-
lim identity.174 In March 2016, the Austrian government deployed mil-
itary forces to its borders and drastically reduced the number of Syrian
refugees it would admit as opinion polls reported growing popularity of
extreme-right wing politicians.175
At least one factor to which researchers have attributed opposition
to Syrian refugees arriving in Europe has been the fear within these
nations of uncontrollable "floods" of involuntary migrants.
176 The cha-
otic nature of the movement of refugees and other forced migrants to
Europe arguably played an important part in the xenophobic anxiety
that framed backlash against these groups-backlash that spread as
far as the United States.177 A recent study from Greece provides
and Justice Leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, . . . has claimed that Muslim immigrants have
'imposed Sharia law in parts of Sweden', 'occupy churches in Italy only to treat them like
toilets' and 'engage in constant trouble-making' in France, Germany and the UK. He has
warned that migrants currently arriving in Europe could cause 'epidemics' as they have
'various parasites and protozoa, which don't affect their organisms, but which could be
dangerous here'."; Jan Cienski, Migrants Carry 'Parasites and Protozoa,' Warns Polish
Opposition Leader, POLITIcO (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.politico.eularticle/migrants-asy-
lum-poland-kaczynski-election/ [https://perma.cclW9UL-HEGP] (archived Jan. 22,
2018).
173. Poland Refuses to Accept Refugees After Brussels Attack, AL JAZEERA (Mar.
23, 2016), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/poland-refuses-accept-refugees-brus-
sels-attack- 160323132500564.html [https:/perma.ce/2525-RWPM] (archived Jan. 21,
2018).
174. "They [non-Christian refugees] can be a threat to Poland. I think it is a great
way for ISIS to locate their troops .. .all around Europe,' said Miriam Shaded." Shaded
is "head of Estera, the Polish foundation that arranged the selection and immigration"
of Christian refugee families entering Poland. Zosia Wasik & Henry Foy, Poland Favors
Christian Refugees from Syria, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2015).
175. Hasselbach, supra note 171.
176. See, e.g., Demetrios G. Papademetriou & Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, Under-
standing and Addressing Public Anxiety About Immigration, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. 12
(July 2016) (noting that many people no longer trust their governments to manage the
migrant flows).
177. Id. at 10 ("The chaotic manner in which migrants and asylum seekers en-
tered Europe in the second half of 2015 and the first few months of 2016 fueled concerns
that terrorists could infiltrate these streams-anxieties that had the strongest effect not
in Europe, but in the United States. The result was a huge backlash against the U.S.
resettlement program (which settles the most-vetted refugees in the world), despite it
bearing little resemblance to the EU situation, which is contending with mass spontane-
ous arrivals of mixed flows.").
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"causal evidence of the effects of exposure to the refugee crisis on sup-
port for extreme-right parties," and its findings suggest "that a sudden
and sharp increase in refugee arrivals fuels radical anti-immigrant and
anti-asylum-seeker parties[.]"178 Studies in other European countries
corroborate this picture.17 9
Chaotic arrival of large numbers of refugees, only made more ter-
rifying by military deployments to keep these refugees out, can only
serve to heighten the fear of polity insiders1 8 0 and to reinforce an in-
herent association between involuntary migrants and economic- or se-
curity-related threats to the receiving state. This is the case even
though mass involuntary displacement is often predictable, and-with
the right international coordination-including through improved law
and policy-could be addressed in a manner that instead permitted or-
derly, humane movement less likely to exacerbate xenophobic anxiety.
To reiterate, chaotic involuntary migration ratchets up xenophobic
anxiety. Global governance of international migration is relevant here
because actual and perceived "floods" of dangerous migrants can be the
178. Elias Dinas et al., Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Moderately Increases Na-
tives' Support for Extreme-Right Parties 3 (2017), https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-
bin/conference/download.cgi?db-name=RESConf2O17&paper_id=1076
[https://perma.cc/SD2U-3BTR] (archived Jan. 22, 2018). The authors of this study con-
clude: "A substantial part of the electoral backlash [in the study] ... can be attributed
to the fact that some communities [in Greece] received a disproportionately high number
of asylum seekers in a very short period of time. This in turn suggests that xenophobic
repercussions among natives might be mitigated if European governments were to invest
more resources in supporting Mediterranean countries in processing asylum claims and
allocating asylum seekers and refugees fairly across all countries [in the region]." Id. at
13.
179. A recent study in Denmark produced similar findings but with marked vari-
ation in the effect of refugee arrivals depending on the size of the municipality receiving
the refugees, and whether the municipality was rural or urban. Christian Dustmann,
Kristine Vasiljeva & Anna Piil Damm, Refugee Migration and Electoral Outcomes,
CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS OF MIGRATION 2-4 (2016) (http://www.cream-mi-
gration.org/publ-uploads/CDP_19-16.pdf) [https://perma.cclRNV9-GF6A] (archived Jan.
22, 2018). A study in Austria found evidence that after an extreme right wing party dou-
bled its share of votes on an anti-refugee/anti-migrant platform, increased contact among
refugees and Austrian hosts dampened anti-refugee hostility. Andreas Steinmayr, Expo-
sure to Refugees and Voting for the Far-Right: (Unexpected) Results from Austria, IZA
DP No. 9790, at 3 (Mar. 2016), http://ftp.iza.org/dp9790.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG75-
YSNE] (archived Feb 11, 2018). This suggests that policies managing migration might
be better tailored to promote more harmonious interactions among involuntary migrants
and receiving populations.
180. Chantal Thomas has argued that as migrants move from the global south to
the north, the anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling international treaties adopted by the
world's states at Palermo have "the effect of throwing a shadow of suspicion over entire
regions of the world that are viewed thereafter as suppliers of criminality[.]" Chantal
Thomas, Undocumented Migrant Workers in a Fragmented International Order, 25 MD.
J. OF INT'L L. 187, 211, 213 (2013).
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partial function of the international and regional law applicable to the
movement of involuntary migrants.
18 1 Insofar as xenophobic anxiety is
responsive to chaotic international movement perceived by receiving
nations as heralding the arrival of unmanageable "floods" of the invol-
untarily displaced, international law and policy seemingly makes this
problem worse.
The global refugee regime specifically is also implicated here. First,
disproportionate refugee responsibility sharing can drive refugees to
take dangerous chaotic journeys in order to survive. Consider the fact
that during periods of especially low international assistance to refu-
gees in countries in the region such as Jordan, Syrian refugees report-
edly chose to return to Syria and risk death in conflict, rather than face
starvation in regional host countries.
1 8 2 More generally, early research
identified regional conditions of scarcity and livelihood precariousness
as drivers of Syrian refugee movements from the Middle East and
North Africa onward to Europe.
183 In this case, there is a sense in
which shortcomings in the international law governing refugee respon-
sibility sharing can be seen as a "push factor" contributing to the move-
ment of refugees from the Middle East to Europe, thereby creating con-
ditions that go on to ratchet up anxiety about resulting refugee "floods."
The factors and motivations that shape the secondary movement of ref-
ugees and other involuntary migrants from their first receiving coun-
try to another are admittedly diverse and complex, but one among
181. For an introduction to how international law, including international refugee
law, contributes to the chaotic and dangerous movement of refugees and other involun-
tary migrants, see Ramji-Nogales, supra note 1. For a detailed treatment of analogous
flaws in the European regional asylum system, see Maryellen Fullerton, Asylum Crisis
Italian Style: The Dublin Regulation Collides with European Human Rights Law, 29
HARv. Hum. RTS. J. 57 (2016).
182. Int'l Rescue Comm., Syrian Refugees Warn They Have No Choice but To Re-
turn to Syria After Aid Cuts to Food, Health, AKAWANA (Dec. 3, 2014), http://eng-
lish.ankawa.com/?p=13160 [https://perma.cc/8YFS-LH391 (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
183. Natalie Banulescu-Bogdan & Susan Fratzke, Euope's Migration Crisis in
Context: Why Now and What Next? MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Sept. 24, 2015),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/europe%E
2%80% 9 9s-migration-crisis-context-
why-now-and-what-next [https://perma.cc/M73V-5YPD] (archived Jan. 21, 2018) ("The
combination of push factors [driving movement to Europe] includes: (1) the ongoing vio-
lence and instability in origin countries that have both precipitated mass movements
and made return impossible (at least in the short to medium term); (2) the deterioration
of conditions in countries of first asylum which has led some, including Jordan and Leb-
anon, to tighten their borders, limiting access to nearby safe havens for the displaced;
(3) the continued lack of opportunities to work or enroll in school for most refugees, which
is a major driver of onward movements; and (4) geopolitical changes that have closed off
alternative destinations, such as Libya.").
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them is livelihood conditions.184 A more robust global refugee respon-
sibility sharing framework ensuring support to regional hosts could
conceivably have mitigated chaotic secondary forced movement from
regional host countries to Europe.
The second means through which gaps in international refugee law
make refugee movements more chaotic relates to the question of safe
passage, as the following example illustrates. There have been no sig-
nificant legal channels for orderly movement of those fleeing conflict in
the Middle East (and elsewhere) to Europe or other more geograph-
ically remote areas,8 5 and what international law exists exacerbates
the chaos by incentivizing the construction of walls and the deployment
of naval and other missions to forcibly and even fatally obstruct the
movement of involuntarily displaced.186 Recall that international refu-
gee law requires states bound by it to protect refugees within their ju-
risdictions.'87 But passage away from conflict and persecution to safe
jurisdictions is poorly protected in international law. International ref-
ugee law may impose obligations on European nations to extend pro-
tection to refugees within their jurisdiction,'8 8 but it does not legally
184. See, e.g., Joelle Moret et al., The Path of Somali Refugees into Exile, SwIss
FORUM FOR MIGRATION AND POPULATION STUDIES No. 46, at 10 (2006) (study of Somali
refugees and asylum seekers in eight countries, involving almost 1000 respondents and
finding that "[i]n most cases examined, secondary movements are motivated by the
search for legal and socio-economic security and can be viewed as collective coping strat-
egies aiming at diversifying both the risks related to refugee situations and the resources
of the extended family"); Susan E. Zimmermann, Irregular Secondary Movements to Eu-
rope: Seeking Asylum beyond Refuge, 22 J REFUG. STUD. 74-96 (2009) (reviewing a num-
ber of studies finding livelihood conditions to be among the factors that compel secondary
movement of refugees); Susan E. Zimmermann, Why Seek Asylum? The Roles of Integra-
tion and Financial Support, 48 INT'L MIGRATION 199, 224-27 (2010) (small qualitative
study finding livelihood conditions to be a salient push-factor in secondary movements
of Somali refugees to Europe); cf. UNHCR, Profiling Study of Unaccompanied or Sepa-
rated Afghan Children Arriving in Sweden in 2015, at 1 (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.ref-
world.org/docid/582c789f4.html [https://perma.cc/FH56-C3WS] (archived Jan. 22,
2018) (last visited Mar. 22, 2017) (study of unaccompanied or separated Afghan children
in Sweden found that "discrimination, lack of access to rights, and lack of documentation
as their primary motivation for leaving. Economic reasons were only mentioned by a
small fraction (9%) of UASC interviewed.").
185. Along with Syrian refugees making their way to Europe in the movements
that have garnered global policy and popular attention are refugees from other conflicts
in the Middle East and North Africa, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, South Sudan
and elsewhere.
186. See Fullerton, supra note 181, at 132 (discussing how EU members believe
the Dublin system reduces some secondary movement); Ramji-Nogales, supra note 1.
187. Refugee Convention, supra note 70, at art. 33(1) (non-refoulement principle).
188. Article 31 of the Refugee Convention prohibits states from penalizing refu-
gees for unlawful entry or presence. See generally HATHAWAY, supra note 103, 405-12
(2005).
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protect their passage to these jurisdictions.
1 89 This creates strong in-
centives for these nations to prevent the arrivals of refugees onto their
territories, by projecting border control measures far beyond the actual
territories refugees are trying to access.1
9 0 With almost no options for
state-authorized passage to safety outside the region, even displaced
persons legally entitled to protections available through refugee status
opt to put their lives in the hands of smugglers, knowing fully that do-
ing so is to risk death at sea. Many Syrian refugees and other involun-
tary migrants reaching Europe have done so through smuggling net-
works 9 1 that regularly adapt to circumvent sustained and even
NATO-supported European military intervention to prevent refugee
and migrant arrivals.192
The absence of safe passage protections even for refugees, and es-
pecially when they are displaced in large numbers, is not merely an
unconscious international oversight. Review of the drafting record of
the Refugee Convention reveals that "the drafters refused to include
protections for migrants during mass movements let alone for safe pas-
sage to the country of refuge."'9 3 A result of this deliberate choice is
189. As mentioned earlier, there is no right of safe passage in international refu-
gee law, although the European Court of Human Rights has held that states may owe
discrete obligations to assess the individual claims to protection that migrants might
have when they are interdicted in the high seas. Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, App. -
No. 27765/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 54 (2012). The ECtHR has also held that Article 4 of Pro-
tocol 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits collective expul-
sion, provides important protections to involuntary migrants seeking refuge in Europe.
Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Prohibiting Collective Expulsion of Aliens at the European Court of
Human Rights, 20(1) ASIL INSIGHTS (Jan. 4, 2016). For an analysis of the failure of in-
ternational law to establish mechanisms for the safe and orderly movement of people
across borders, regardless of the reasons for migrating, see Ramji-Nogales, supra note 1,
at 16-32. For an argument that the common and often collaborative practices states en-
gage in to prevent refugee arrivals violate international law, see James C. Hatthaway &
Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence, 53
COLUM. J. OF TRANSAT'L L. 235, 243-44 (2015); see also Catheryn Costello, It need not be
like this, 51 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 1, 13-14 (2016) (describing the failure of the EU to
provide a right to safe passage for refugees).
190. See Hatthaway & Gammeltoft-Hansen, supra note 189, at 244-56 (2015) (de-
scribing the old and new non-entree mechanisms that powerful states have developed to
project their borders outwards).
191. See INTERPOL, MIGRANT SMUGGLING IS 'A MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS,' FINDS
JOINT REPORT (May 17, 2016), http://www.interpol.int[News-and-media/News/
2016[N2016-062 (highlighting the vast criminal network of smuggling as a multinational
business) [https://perma.cc/D9YW-4WBG] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
192. See Michael Birnbaum, Smuggling Refugees into Europe Is a New Growth
Industry, THE WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.comlworld/eu-
rope/smuggling-refugees-into-europe-is-a-new-growth-industry/2015/09/03/398c72c4-
517f- 1 1e5-b225-90edbd49f362_story.html [https://perma.cc/XWL3-F9RF] (archived Jan.
21, 2018) (discussing the methods used by Syrian smugglers networks).
193. Ramji-Nogales, supra note 1, at 24-26.
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disorderly, inhumane mass movement of refugees when they flee their
countries of origin and seek safety in better-resourced regions more
distant from the conflict. In this way, gaps in international refugee law
contribute to xenophobic anxiety.
Involuntary migration is also made more chaotic and dangerous by
the failure of international law to provide a global framework attuned
to forms of coerced movement falling outside the refugee definition. In-
ternational and regional law provide limited options for legal and or-
derly movement and admission of non-refugees, creating incentives for
dangerous, desperate migrant journeys.194 As mentioned above, inter-
national refugee law only grants protection to those fleeing a narrowly
circumscribed category of persecution relative to the actual factors that
motivate involuntary international migration.195 There are many shar-
ing migration routes with refugees whose movement is coerced by ex-
treme socioeconomic hardship, climate change-related factors, and
other conditions that as a matter of law place these people beyond the
protection of international refugee law. In this respect, the interna-
tional migration law governing involuntary displacement and migra-
tion is woefully inadequate-it puts no system in place to respond in a
humane and organized fashion to displacement and migration that is
also largely foreseeable. This means that from the perspective of inter-
national law, states owe too many of the people making dangerous jour-
neys too few obligations extraterritorially and may exclude these pop-
ulations referred to in popular discourse as "economic migrants" on an
almost unfettered discretionary basis.196 With few viable legal options
for moving across international borders, even where this international
194. Consider, for example, that notwithstanding German policy in 2015 welcom-
ing Syrian refugees many European countries between Syria and Germany clamped
down harshly to prevent the movement of Syrian refugees, even countries themselves
bound by international refugee law. This led to a boom in business for smugglers, and
loss of life for desperate involuntary migrants such as 71 refugees who were found dead
in an abandoned truck on an Austrian road, after Hungary shutdown refugee access to
trains traveling to western Europe. Alexander Weber et al., Four Suspects Held After
Austria Discovers 71 Dead Refugees, Bloomberg (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2015-08-28/refugee-deaths-in-austrian-truck-exceed- 70
[https://perma.cc/HXT5-Y4C2] (archived Jan. 22, 2018); Hungary's Xenophobia, Europe's
Crisis, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-09-
02/hungary-s-xenophobia-europe-s-crisis [http://perma.cc/6NMK-8287] (archived Jan.
22, 2018).
195. Francois Crepeau & Idil Atak, Global Migration Governance: Avoiding Com-
mitments on Human Rights, Yet Tracing a Course of Cooperation, 34 NETH. Q. OF Hum.
RTS. 113, 120 (2016) ("Today this regime is facing difficulties in adequately addressing
the protection needs of forced migrants.").
196. See RACHEL McADAM, COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEE LAW 6-10 (2007) (explaining the basis of internationally protected involuntary
migration).
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movement benefits both involuntary migrants and receiving states, mi-
grants pursue unauthorized and often predictably chaotic alterna-
tives.19 7 States then respond with haphazard but coordinated efforts to
repel these unauthorized migrants that then incentivize alternate and
often even more dangerous journeys as these migrants circumvent ef-
forts to keep them out. The resulting chaos reinforces the specter
among receiving populations of threatening, unvetted foreigners who
pose a security threat. These populations are then arguably more likely
to support sweeping exclusionary measures because of heightened xen-
ophobic and other anti-migrant anxiety.
Above is a story of how gaps in international law and certain state
policies fuel backlash against involuntary migrants, some of it xeno-
phobic. In the last few years, such backlash has subsequently fueled
deterioration of migration policy. This deterioration takes the form,
among others, of policies that then worsen international law's xeno-
phobic anxiety-inducing features (e.g., furthering the poorly resourced
regional containment of refugees). This raises the specter of a vicious
,cycle.198 Although many complex factors explain the failure to achieve
equitable and sustainable distribution of refugees within the European
Union, and globally for that matter, xenophobic anxiety is a part of the
equation. Popular and political opposition to refugees and involuntary
migrants across Europe has raised the political costs of humane and
197. A recent study on involuntary migration channels into Europe finds that the
available data suggests that "[a] plurality of people seeking humanitarian protection ar-
rives via unauthorised channels[.]" Susan Fratzke & Brian Salant, Tracing the Channels
Refugees Use to Seek Protection in Europe 1, MIGRATION POLIcY INSTITUTE (2017). It also
underscores the need for better data on involuntary migration channels.
198. This cycle would take the following form: legal and policy failure exacerbate
xenophobic anxiety- xenophobic anxiety deteriorates law and policy regulating involun-




even economically beneficial admission of these groups across that con-
tinent.9 9 German Chancellor Angela Merkel's welcoming of Syrian ref-
ugees provided an example, when she faced a tough road to re-election
in part due to her stance on refugees.2 0 0
Worse still, xenophobic anxiety directed at Syrian refugees and
other involuntary migrants from North Africa and the Middle East has
traveled far further than the refugees and migrants themselves.2 01
Across the Atlantic, in the United States, legislators, presidential can-
didates, and other public figures mobilized xenophobic anxiety in 2015
into 2016 that arguably helps explain why by the end of November
2015, the United States had accepted fewer than 2,500 Syrian refu-
gees.202 More recently, this xenophobic anxiety has contributed to ini-
tiatives such as the indefinite blanket ban on Syrian refugees seeking
admission to the United States pursued by the Trump administration
in early 2017, even as that administration threatened to escalate mili-
tary intervention in the Middle East that would reliably produce refu-
gees fleeing for their lives.203
Contraction of refugee responsibility sharing has also manifested
in the redoubling of active regional containment of refugees, quite
apart from passive but nonetheless impactful policies such as the re-
fusal to accept Syrian refugees for resettlement. In 2016, the European
199. Phil Thornton, Bank Slams European Xenophobia'As It Sets Out New Refu-
gee Strategy, GLOB. CAP. 11 (Oct. 11, 2015), http://www.globalcapital.com/arti-
cle/yvxxm9tv88zb/bank-slams-european-xenophobia-as-it-sets-out-new-refugee- strat-
egy [https://perma.cclJSA4-QXME] (archived Jan. 22, 2018) (quoting the World Bank's
President as saying "Many advanced economies have increasingly advanced aged popu-
lations, a rapidly shrinking workforce and very low birth rates so they need migrants
and it should be part of their economic strategy to recruit the kind of immigrants that
will help them[.] . . . Xenophobia is actually a very bad economic strategy. . . .").
200. Jess Mchugh, German Chancellor Angela Merkel Poll Support Drops Amid
Refugee Crisis, INT'L Bus. TIMES (May 10, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.com/german-chan-
cellor-angela-merkel-poll-support-drops-amid-refugee-crisis-2367038
[https://perma.ce/56AE-4WYT] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
201. Bangstad, Presentation for Conference on Xenophobia nd Social Integration,
supra note 170; see Sindre Bangstad, The Rise of the Populist Right in Norway, BOS. REV.
(June 3, 2015) ("The communicative flows of globalization and the ubiquity of various
social media means that xenophobia and xenophobic discourses, imaginaries and rhetor-
ical tropes 'travel' like never before.").
202. Ian Bremmer, These 5 Facts Explain America's Shameful Reaction to Syrian
Refugees, TIME (Nov. 30, 2015), http://time.com/412637 1/these-5-facts-explain-americas-
shameful-reaction-to-syrian-refugees/ [https:/perma.cc/8RMM-SK5B] (archived Jan. 21,
2018).
203. Gabriel Samuels, Donald Trump's First US Military Raid 'Kills 30 Civilians,
including 10 Women and Children,' THE INDEPENDENT, http://www.independ-
ent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/donald-trump-us-military-attack-yemen-civilians-
women-children-dead-a7553121.html [https://perma.cc/8KX9-ENAD] (archived Jan. 22,
2018).
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Union eventually managed to secure an agreement with Turkey to
keep Syrian refugees and other involuntary migrants from leaving
Turkey bound for the European Union.
204 This agreement is in effect a
quarantining device, reinforcing the regional containment of refugees.
This reinforced regional containment may result in heightened xeno-
phobic anxiety within Syria's vicinity. And if the EU-Turkey deal were
to falter, the likelihood of resumed flows to Europe is non-trivial given
that the factors driving displacement from the Middle East and North
Africa remain unchanged.2 0 5 The chaotic movement that would result
might then repeat the interplay between international law and the
problem of xenophobia in the counterproductive, xenophobia-com-
pounding dynamic already described.
In sum, there is good reason to believe that there is a causal rela-
tionship of some kind between the chaotic, poorly regulated large-scale
involuntary displacement he world is witnessing and xenophobic anx-
iety.20 6 This chaos must be understood as intimately related to prob-
lems with the applicable international law and policy identified and
the incentive structures they create for receiving states, their citizens,
and involuntary migrants fleeing their countries of nationality.
IV. IMPROVING THE EMERGING ANTI-XENOPHOBIA FRAMEWORK
The crux of the argument in the previous two Parts has been that
there is good reason to connect xenophobic anxiety to the law and policy
governing involuntary migration. This Part discusses the implications
of this claim for the developing global anti-xenophobia framework and
its prejudice approach. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to ad-
dress what might appear to be a mismatch between some of the more
radical implications of the advanced critique and the far less radical
policy implications that are nonetheless worthy of pursuit in light of
all that is at stake.
204. Elizabeth Collett, The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, MIGRATION
POL'Y INST., http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal
[https://perma.cclP4EY-ET5W] (archived Jan. 22, 2018). As others have noted, today
"Global North states prefer 'regional' solutions, far from their shores, such as enhancing
the protection capacity and asylum systems in partner countries and regions[," as op-
posed to solidarity and responsibility-sharing. Crepeau & Atak, supra note 195, at 121.
205. Ceylan Yeginsu, Refugees Pour Out of Turkey Once More as Deal With Europe
Falters, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/15/worldleu-
rope/turkey-syria-refugees-eu.html? r=0 [https://perma.cc/E4SV-G5HD] (archived Jan.
22, 2018).
206. Although the examples above have highlighted xenophobic violence and po-
litical rhetoric, both occur in the context of widespread structural xenophobic discrimi-




There are untold structural ills responsible for xenophobic anxiety
and the more general problem of xenophobia that have little to do di-
rectly with international law and policy. For this reason, an interna-
tional legal analysis focusing on migration such as that at the heart of
this Article could hardly purport to identify "ideal solutions" where
"ideal" means the problem of xenophobia would disappear entirely. But
it is possible to imagine an ideal legal solution to the problem of xeno-
phobia, where "ideal" described an alternative that would at the very
least minimize law's contribution to making the problem worse, and
maximize its contribution to making it better.2 07 This subpart consid-
ers briefly what an ideal solution in this more modest utopian sense
would entail.
There is a way in which the problem of xenophobia goes to the very
core of the global order of nation-states and the international law that
dictates the terms of nation statehood. Nation-states resist admission
and inclusion of non-nationals in part because international law enti-
tles them to do so. Although nation-states have domestic legal regimes
dictating the meaning and contours of state sovereignty with respect
to non-national exclusion,20 8 it is international law that dictates the
structure or "container" within which these domestic regimes must fit
in order for any political community to be recognized as a nation-
state.20 9 The dominant formulation of the defining criteria of statehood
under international law includes effective government over a defined
207. The recently completed Model International Mobility Convention,
http://globalpolicy.columbia.edulmobility-convention, is an example of an attempt to de-
velop a "realistic Utopia." Michael W. Doyle, International Convention on the Rights and
Duties of All Persons Moving from One State to Another and of the States they Leave,
Transit or Enter, COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L. L. 1, 2 (2017), http://globalpolicy.colum-
bia.edu/sites/default/files/mimc-document.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V5W-QTTK] (archived
Jan. 22, 2018). For a commentary on this Model Convention, see E. Tendayi Achiume,
The Fatal Flaw in International Law for Migration, 56 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L. L. 257
(2018).
208. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Case 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) ("The power of
exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of
the United States as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the
right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests
of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of anyone.").
209. See JAMES R. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
32 (2006) (citation omitted) ("In its most common modern usage, sovereignty is the term
for the 'totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law' as
residing in an independent territorial unit-the State.").
2018/ 391
VANDERBILT JOURMAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
territory.210 Chantal Thomas notes that the "'effective government' cri-
terion rests on a long tradition of positivist jurisprudence which as-
cribes sovereignty to the fact of coercive control over territory."
21 1 Per-
haps even more important is international law's designation of the
nation-state as the priority vehicle for collective self-determination,
and the expansive right to exclude non-nationals that international le-
gal theory has defended as an existential feature of state sovereignty.
To be sure, an absolutist conception of state sovereignty with respect
to the right to exclude non-nationals is at odds with contemporary in-
ternational law.212 However, dynamics described above suggest, as Da-
vid Martin has argued, that notwithstanding the inroads that interna-
tional human rights and refugee law may have made into the "complete
sovereign authority over a defined territory and population," the fol-
lowing remains true:
The underlying principle or default rule remains, and the restrictions on state
authority arise by way of exception. Moreover, national populations, particularly
in times of economic stress or security threat, tend to show strong devotion to the
principle of broad state authority, and may frame demands for state action in
response to such difficulties on the assumption of wide national discretion over
the entry and residence of foreigners.
2 1 3
Insofar as international law buttresses such national articulation of
state sovereignty, it legitimizes even acute exclusion of involuntary mi-
grants. International law's sovereignty doctrine should be seen as a
210. The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1(b-c),
Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. The two remaining criteria are "a perma-
nent population" and the "capacity to enter into relations with other States." Id. at art.
1(a, d).
211. Chantal Thomas, What Does the Emerging International Law of Migration
Mean for Sovereignty, 14 MELB. J. INT'L L. 392, 415 (2013); see generally id. (analyzing
how different political theory traditions have constructed state sovereignty, and the lim-
itations of these constructions transmit into international law).
212. Id. at 404 n.43 (citing Emer de Vattel's articulation of the "absolutist" posi-
tion of the conventional view: "The sovereign may forbid the entrance of his territory
either to foreigners in general or in particular cases, or to certain particular purposes,
according as he may think it advantageous to the state. There is nothing in all this that
does not flow from the rights of domain and sovereignty: everyone is obliged to pay re-
spect to the prohibition: and whoever dares to violate it incurs the penalty decreed to
render it effectual."). It is contested that early international legal theorists, Vattel in-
cluded, ever conceived of the sovereign right of national exclusion as quite so absolute.
See James A. R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77
AM. J. INT'L L. 804, 807 (1983) (tracing the absolutist position to the late 19th Century
when domestic law in mainly Britain and America consolidated this view of sover-
eignty.).
213. David A. Martin, The Authority and Responsibility of States, in MIGRATION
AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 31-32 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Vincent Chetail
eds., 2003) (emphasis added).
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predicate of xenophobic anxiety, given that this anxiety operates from
a baseline of entitled exclusion.
If indeed the problem of xenophobia goes to the very foundation of
the global nation-state system, then admittedly none of the recommen-
dations briefly proposed here will truly disrupt international law's in-
timacy with this problem. Such a disruption would require a radical
reimagining of international law and nation-state sovereignty to align
it with the world at hand, which is characterized by deep historical,
economical, and even territorial interconnection and interdepend-
ence.214 This is a project too large to fit within the scope of the present
Article, although it is one I have begun to explore elsewhere.2 15 In-
stead, the remainder of this Part focuses on the implications of the ar-
guments in Part II for policy reform that could meaningfully improve
upon the status quo, even if such reform falls far short of the funda-
mental reordering of the international system that may be required
fully to address the concerns that motivate the present intervention.
The policy reform proposed below is important because it may result in
less loss of life and more humane outcomes for involuntary migrants
and even their hosts, than if the prejudice approach alone were to re-
main the trajectory of the Framework. In other words, the reform pro-
posals below offer an important and urgent improvement on the domi-
nant approaches.
B. Second Bests?: Targeting the Ratchets
The prejudice approach alone cannot account for the role of legal
and policy frameworks and of nation-state actors within them in exac-
erbating the problem of xenophobia. An important dimension of any
serious global anti-xenophobia framework must be explicit engage-
ment with how to diffuse the foreseeable propensity of global frame-
works and state actors to make the problem worse. As a result, it is
important that international actors shift the trajectory of the Frame-
work to account for xenophobic anxiety ratchets seemingly endogenous
to global governance frameworks. This action is especially required of
214. Thomas, supra note 180, at 448. ("If sovereignty is premised upon an atom-
istic conception of the state of nature, then surely a more interconnected understanding
of nature raises the question whether the basic presumption of autonomy that under-
girds sovereignty should shift in favor of a politics of interdependence.").
215. See E. Tendayi Achiume, Re-Imagining International Law for Global Migra-
tion: Migration as Decolonization?, 111 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 142, 143-45 (2017) (introducing
a preliminary proposal for reconceiving the movement of certain migrants across inter-
national borders today as decolonization in order to achieve a new and productive logic
and ethics for international law's application to global migration, one that reflects per-
sisting global interconnection initiated during the European colonial project).
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the various UN agencies and other actors spearheading reform of the
global governance of involuntary displacement, to the extent they can
influence state actors to follow their lead.
Notwithstanding the acknowledged urgency of the problem of xen-
ophobia, both the Secretary-General's report and the New York Decla-
ration laid out a roadmap for priority global intervention that fails to
take seriously the role of global migration governance frameworks and
their respective incentive structures in exacerbating the problem of
xenophobia.216 This is disappointing given that the Secretary-Gen-
eral's report in the lead up to the New York Declaration makes pointed
reference to structural drivers of xenophobia,
217 including a passing
but pointed reference to the global migration governance regime.
2 18 Es-
sentially, combatting xenophobia and its manifestations requires re-
forming the global governance of involuntary migration. The analysis
in the previous Part recommends some specific interventions.
The first would involve replacing the under-funded, regional con-
tainment of refugees tolerated and facilitated by existing international
law with a system for more equitably distributing the cost and respon-
sibility of refugee protection.219 If this account of the role played by the
existing regime is correct,2 20 such reforms might avoid escalation of
xenophobic anxiety in regions close to conflict by altering the objective
conditions of scarcity and precarity that can seemingly fuel this anxiety
in the Third World or in other places such as Greece that dispropor-
tionately shoulder involuntary migrant responsibility. In the New York
Declaration, states introduce a Comprehensive Refugee Response
216. See supra Part 1.
217. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/70/59, supra note 93, ¶ 37 (expressing concern that
erection of fences and walls in response to large movements of refugees and migrants
can reinforce xenophobia and undermine global cooperation on migration).
218. He notes: "Poor governance structures that institutionally perpetuate rather
than counter exclusion, marginalization and discrimination are often structural reasons
for large movements." U.N. Doc. A/70/59, supra note 93, ¶ 26. The argument of this Ar-
ticle has been that weaknesses in the governance structure seemingly shape the nature
of the large movements and exacerbates resistance to migrants.
219. For examples of proposals more equitable and sustainable approaches to
global refugee responsibility-sharing, see, for example, Achiume, Syria, Cost-Sharing,
supra note 139, at 725, 734; Deborah Anker et al., supra note 145, at 295; Hathaway &
Alexander Neve, supra note 145, at 143. For a recent market-based proposal, see Mitu
Gulati & Joseph Blocher, Competing for Refugees: A Market-Based Solution to a Human-
itarian Crisis 48 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 108-11 (2016). But see E.
Tendayi Achiume, The Fact of Xenophobia and the Fiction of State Sovereignty: A Reply
to Blocher and Gulati, COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 2 (2017) (offering a prag-
matic and normative critique of the market-based proposal).
220. See supra Part 111(a), REFUGEE REGIONAL CONTAINMENT AND GEO-
POLITICALLY INFLECTED XENOPHOBIC ANXIETY.
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Framework (CRRF) and commit to its implementation.2 21 This CRRF
is a start. For example, it proposes a number of ways to enhance global
refugee cost- and responsibility-)sharing.222 However, as it stands, it
creates none of the legal obligations that would increase pressure, es-
pecially on First World states and others that are not doing enough to
share the cost and responsibility of involuntary displacement, to do
more.2 23
The second set of reforms would aim to mitigate the chaos and
inhumanity of involuntary migration, again to dampen their possible
role in providing rich fodder for xenophobic anxiety. This might be
achieved, for a start, by reforming the global refugee regime to include
a robust mechanism for safe passage for refugees fleeing conflict, in-
cluding those who are forced or chose to seek refuge beyond the regions
where the conflict is located. The New York Declaration includes a com-
mitment by UN member states to expand legal pathways to admission
for refugees,224 and this commitment should also find expression in
binding international legal obligations that account for the real-world
factors that keep refugees' journeys dangerous.
Just as vital is the expansion of legal, orderly migration channels
for international involuntary migrants whose movement is currently
unauthorized or unprotected under international law.225 This includes,
for example, those whose movement is forced by climate change-related
events and those whose involuntary movement is forced by severe so-
cioeconomic conditions. Many involuntary migrants-refugees in-
cluded-move in search of better life chances, which they aim to
achieve through securing better employment opportunities in destina-
tion countries than those that currently exist in countries of origin.
These involuntary migrants, who can spend their lives in destination
countries as unauthorized or "illegal" migrants, nonetheless often play
221. New York Declaration, supra note 19, ¶ 17.
222. Id. T 6-16.
223. States can and do regularly violate international law, but the existence of
this law also creates a basis for accountability, which can be vital for curtailing problem-
atic state policy on migration. Domestic and regional litigation successfully challenging
such practice on the basis of international and regional law are cases in point. See, e.g.,
Hirsi Jamaa, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 56-58. But see Ralph Wilde, 'Unintended Consequences?
Do Progressive Legal Developments Protecting Forced Migrants Undermine Protection in
Other Areas?', AM. J. OF INT'L LAW UNBOUND (cautioning of the importance of reckoning
with the way progressive efforts towards human rights regulation of extraterritorial
state activity on migration can precipitate backlash that negatively impacts migrants).
224. New York Declaration, supra note 19, T 78.
225. For recent insights regarding reform on both fronts, see Fullerton, supra note
181, 127-33; Ramji-Nogales, supra note 1.
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a part in the national prosperity of these countries.
226 The labor dimen-
sion of even coerced international movement calls for a more prominent
role for a body, such as the ILO, 22 7 in global coordination efforts to com-
bat the problem of xenophobia. It is likely that facilitating orderly labor
migration channels for involuntary migrants would do more to quell
xenophobic anxiety sensitive to chaotic movement than global cam-
paigns portraying migrants positively ever could. The New York Dec-
laration states that a Global Compact on Migration could include "fa-
cilitation of safe, orderly, regular and responsible migration and
mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned
and well-managed migration policies; this may include the creation
and expansion of safe, regular pathways of migration []"
2 28 However,
these features are non-optional for a functioning global migration re-
gime and would also arguably disable or minimize the xenophobic anx-
iety ratchets that should be associated with the lack of legal pathways
for involuntary migration.
So far this Part has made three proposals: (1) replacing the under-
funded, regional containment of refugees tolerated and facilitated by
existing international law with a system for more equitably distrib-
uting the cost and responsibility of refugee protection; (2) institution-
alizing a means of ensuring refugees safety from conflict; and (3) ex-
panding the legal, orderly migration channels for international
involuntary migrants whose movement is currently unauthorized or
unprotected under international law. All three proposals involve action
that nation-states have so far been reluctant to take. The Global Com-
pacts, however, present a perfect opportunity for change. It remains to
be seen how deep these Compacts will go, reform-wise, and unfortu-
nately the recent global salience of populist nationalist politics espe-
cially in the First World does not bode well.
By treating international migration as a phenomenon to be made
more humane rather than curtailed, the purchase of this Article's pro-
posals may seem largely limited to those normatively oriented towards
more inclusive societies. What interest would sovereign nations start-
ing from a baseline commitment to restrictive immigration have in my
proposals? For example, if the aim is diminishing xenophobic backlash
226. See, e.g., Ramanujan Nadadur, Illegal Immigration: A Positive Economic
Contribution to the United States, 35 J. OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUD. 1037, 1038
(2009) (arguing that illegal immigration has a positive impact on the US economy).
227. The ILO is a tripartite U.N. agency that "brings together governments, em-
ployers and workers of 187 member states to set labour standards, develop policies and
devise programmes promoting decent work for all women and men." INTERNATIONAL
LABoUR ORGANIZATION, About the ILO, http://www.ilo.org/globallabout-the-ilo/lang--
en/index.htm [https:/perma.cc/6GMT-3KJN] (archived Mar. 7, 2018)
228. New York Declaration, supra note 19, at Annex 2, Part 8(e).
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and fallout, why not propose that European states or the United States
invest in technologies that more effectively curtail involuntary migra-
tion in the first place? In some respects, this logic was on display in the
2016 agreement reached between Turkey and the European Union ref-
erenced above. The same logic is arguably at play in the European Un-
ion's partnerships with African states to contain migration, including
through militarization of national borders of frontier and transit coun-
tries in Africa.229
The fact is that these regional containment approaches may be in-
creasingly untenable, to say nothing of their horrific consequences.
Consider that if the proportion of the global population that is interna-
tional migrants remains constant, there will be 321 million interna-
tional migrants by 2050.230 At the same time, more than 50 percent of
global population growth until 2050 is predicted to occur in Africa.23 '
Even if European Union-supported development initiatives are suc-
cessful in improving livelihood conditions in sending countries in Af-
rica, this may in fact initially lead to even more emigration, including
towards Europe, because of the complex ways that resources shape in-
ternational migration capability.232 Current projections are that by
2050, 82 percent of population growth in high-income countries will be
due to international migration.233
229. See, e.g., Alissa J. Rubin & Jason Horowitz, European Leaders Look to Africa
to Stem Migration, N. Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/
worldleurope/africa-migrants-europe.html?action-click&contentCollection=world&re-
gion=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=sec-
tionfront&_r=O [https://perma.cc/7GSX-DHCZ] (archived Jan. 22, 2018) (discussing re-
cent partnerships between EU members and African states to contain migration). For
analysis of human rights violations that have resulted from off-shore processing of refu-
gees and other involuntary migrants seeking access to Europe, see Azadeh Dastyari,
Processing Centres in North Africa are Not the Answer for EU Refugees, THE
CONVERSATION (Sept. 14, 2017), https://theconversation.com/processing-centres-in-
north-africa-are-not-the-answer-for-eu-refugees-83729 [https://perma.cc/EZ5R-63KR]
(archived Jan. 22, 2018); Daria Davitti, Why Offshore Processing of Refugees Bound for
Europe is Such a Bad Idea, THE CONVERSATION (July, 26, 2017), https://theconversa-
tion.com/why-offshore-processing-of-refugees-bound-for-europe-is-such-a-bad-idea-
81695 [https://perma.cc/4HHT-9W7E] (archived Jan. 22, 2018).
230. U.N. Doc. A/70/59, supra note 93, T 23.
231. U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World Population Pro-
spects: The 2015 Revision, U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP.241, at 3 (2015).
232. Research shows that the poorest of the poor do not have the means to migrate
internationally. Marginal increases in socioeconomic well-being might well be insuffi-
cient to chill motivation or pressure to migrate internationally, but instead provide more
people with the means to do so. See, e.g., Philip L. Martin, Migration and Development:
Toward Sustainable Solutions, INTL INST. FOR LAB. STUD. (Discussion paper No. 153,
2004) (stressing that economic development in a migrant-sending country is likely first
to increase out-migration before it reduces it).
233. U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, supra note 231, at 6.
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Once climate change-driven displacement is brought into the pic-
ture, global involuntary migration projections point to movement on so
large a scale as to make coercive exclusionary practices either less ef-
fective or only effective with even more explicit and widespread vio-
lence than is seen today. Regional containment of involuntary mi-
grants in north Africa, for example, which is achieved in no small part
through European financing and manpower, is partly to blame for the
rise of migrant slave markets reported in Niger and Libya.234 Adapting
global governance of migration to contemporary and projected patterns
of movement arguably requires acceptance (even if grudging) that peo-
ple are only becoming more mobile,2 35 and that if the global order is to
retain any semblance of the liberal values it professes, bigger, further-
reaching walls are an untenable strategy.
V. CONCLUSION
The scale and pattern of involuntary migration in the last five
years have made vivid the inadequacy of the global governance frame-
works in place to address this migration. As backlash against involun-
tary migration has intensified-especially in Europe and North Amer-
ica-an emerging global anti-xenophobia framework (the Framework)
is discernable and has gained new momentum. This Article is the first
to identify this emerging Framework and has argued that the Frame-
work's narrow focus on addressing individual acts and attitudes of xen-
ophobic prejudice misses the role that international law, policy, and
state action on migration seemingly play in making the problem of xen-
ophobia worse. It posits specific "xenophobic anxiety ratchets," includ-
ing in the global refugee regime, and proposes a new approach that
places reform of the global governance of involuntary migration at the
center of global cooperation to mitigate the problem of xenophobia.
234. Emma Graham-Harrison, Migrants from west Africa being 'sold in Libyan
slave markets', THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2017/apr/10/libya-public-slave-auctions-un-migration
[https://perma.cc/YMJ4-GDL2] (archived Jan. 22, 2018); Press Release, International
Organization for Migration, IOM Learns of 'Slave Market' Conditions Endangering Mi-
grants in North Africa (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.iom.int/news/iom-learns-slave-mar-
ket-conditions-endangering-migrants-north-africa [https://perma.cc/Q4RJ-KT4Y] (ar-
chived Jan. 22, 2018).
235. If the proportion of the global population that is international migrants re-
mains constant, there will be 321 million international migrants by 2050.
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